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For almost a decade and a half since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the Port Security Grant Program has provided funding to project 
proposals for improving the security and resiliency posture of the nation’s ports 
and waterways. The United States has over 360 coastal and inland ports through 
which over $1.3 trillion in cargo moves annually; a safe, secure, and efficient 
MTS is critical to national security. The PSGP is intended to enhance port 
security and resiliency by funding proposals to provide increased risk 
management, measures to mitigate disruptions and facilitate port recovery, and 
maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from attacks. The PSGP has matured to include funding for all-hazards 
threatening the ports—natural, accidental, and intentional. This thesis seeks to 
evaluate how well the PSGP has met those goals and if it should be improved, 
reorganized or eliminated. 
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For almost a decade and a half since the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the Port Security Grant Program has provided funding to projects with 
the intention of improving the security posture of the nation’s ports and 
waterways. The United States has over 360 coastal and inland ports through 
which over $1.3 trillion in cargo moves annually; a safe, secure, and efficient 
MTS is critical to national security.1  “[T]he PSGP is [intended] to provide funding 
to the nation’s highest risk port areas to support increased port-wide risk 
management; to enhance domain awareness; to train and exercise; to expand 
port recovery and resiliency capabilities; and to further capabilities to prevent, 
detect, respond to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive 
devices and other nonconventional weapons.”2 This inquiry evaluated how well 
the PSGP has met those goals and determine if it can be improved, reorganized 
or has fulfilled its role and should be eliminated.  
 
Methodology  
The primary focus of this study is a consideration of policy options 
analysis for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). In this effort, a combination 
of literature review, interviews, and surveys methodologies was utilized. 
At the outset, a thorough review of relevant literature was conducted. The 




1Josh Peters, “Overview of the United States Coast Guard’s Cyber Strategy and the MTS” 
(presentation, Ninth Coast Guard District, Cleveland, OH, March 29, 2016). 
2Government Accountability Office, “Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant 
Management, and Effectiveness Measurements Should be Strengthened,” GAO-12-47, Month 
Day, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47 (accessed January 6, 2016), 1–2. 
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 Foundation Doctrine—the laws, regulations, policies, and 
guidelines that define the national expectations for port security; 
 Academic Discourse—thesis, dissertations, peer-reviewed journals, 
white papers, research papers, studies, and similar documents; 
 Other Literature—Media, blogs, non-peer-reviewed journals and 
publications, and mass media.  
The survey was a short series of questions consisting of a mix of 
demographic questions, yes/no responses, multiple choice options, and seven 
point Likert Scale assessments. The respondents were subject matter experts 
and stakeholders of the Port Security Grant Program. 
Interviews were conducted with national level program managers and 
smaller subset of stakeholders. The questions were free-form, specific to the 
respondent’s experience with the PSGP, with some input from the survey results 
to initiate the conversation. 
 
Analysis 
There is a tremendous amount of literature on the topic of grants in 
general and the Port Security Grant Program specifically. The spectrum of 
references included official government reports, academic papers, white papers, 
industry analysis, statistical reports, and more. Unfortunately, the response to the 
survey was small, although apparent patterns are discernible. While not 
statistically supportable, the responses were useful in guiding the conversations 
during the interviews, which were exceptionally insightful. 
 
Recommendations 
The Maritime Transportation System (MTS) is a system-of-systems 
construct. It is an emergence outcome from the continually evolving interaction 
between commercial and regulatory actors. The foundation policies, from the 
Presidential Directives to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan recognize 
 xvii
the complex network that sustains the MTS across multiple Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) Sectors. 
By being armed with that knowledge and understanding, the best 
programmatic approach to the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) should be 
one that seeks to promote systems solutions for investing in improved port 
security and resiliency. However, the history of the PSGP has been a moving 
target, ultimately focusing on individual port entities and stakeholders rather than 
port-wide systems solutions. To counter that imbalance between national policy 
and program strategy, the following recommendations are suggested: 
 Maintain the PSGP as a Discrete Grant Program.  Periodically, 
factions of both the Legislative and Executive Branches of the 
Federal Government have suggested eliminating the PSGP as a 
specific, discrete grant program, and instead rolling it into a 
homeland security block grant. Ports would then have to compete 
against all other jurisdictions and communities for grant funding. 
The ports are national borders through which over 90% of our 
international trade takes place. They represent a last opportunity to 
prevent a terrorist attack using the maritime nexus. A natural 
disruptive event would also have grave cascading economic 
consequences, particularly for companies that depend on just-in-
time processes. Disruption to the MTS would weaken all other 
systems and make interior jurisdictions more vulnerable. 
 Improve Transparency of Proposal Review and Grant Award 
Process. The PSGP is almost universally criticized by the port 
stakeholders competing for grants through their Area Maritime 
Security Committees (AMSC) for failing to keep applicants and 
AMSCs informed. No feedback is provided to applicants whose 
proposals fail to win grants. There is no feedback provided to the 
AMSCs as to why the national program managers modify their 
proposed port priorities. Transparent communications between the 
program managers and stakeholder communities must be 
improved. 
 Jettison the Cookie Cutter. The standard guidelines for submitting 
PSGP proposals throughout its existence have been a “one-size-
fits-all” model, treating all ports as a homogeneous construct. The 
PSGP has, with few exceptions, targeted grants to single entities 
rather than seeking to award port-wide proposals. While the 
foundation doctrine speaks of the MTS complexity as a system of 
systems, the PSGP addresses port security and resiliency from a 
 xviii
reductionist point of view. The PSGP has to recognize that each 
port is different and system-wide solutions, including the allowance 
for consortia, is a valuable option to addressing port security and 
resiliency gaps and should be accepted as grant applicants. The 
former port tier/group system was a valuable tool for prioritizing 
grant awards and should be restored to the PSGP. 
 Fully Employ Port-wide Risk Management Plans (PRMP). PRMPs 
provide value-added identification of port-wide security and 
resiliency gaps and a roadmap for developing a gap closure 
strategy. PRMPs provide for measurable goals and supportable 
investment justifications (IJ). They also look at solving problems 
from the MTS level, rather than the individual entity level. PRMPs 
should be required resources for all AMSC, kept up to date, and 
referenced in IJs. 
 Keep Cost Sharing at 25% for All Stakeholders. The Cost Share 
contribution has been a moving target across PSGP iterations. At 
times, the private sector share has been 50% while the public 
sector remained at 25%. A flat rate for all stakeholders encourages 
greater participation and should be made a permanent feature of 
the PSGP. 
 PSGP Core Capabilities Objectives Must Be Revised. The 
objectives for PSGP funding has remained essentially unchanged 
over the course of the program’s life. Some of the core capabilities 
have been demoted, others resolved, and others still simply stale. It 
is time to revise the objectives for port security grants, with a focus 
on enhancing port resiliency and port-wide systemic solutions. 
 Replace references to the Risk Equations as  
Risk = Vulnerability X Threat X Consequence 
with  
R= ƒ[(V)(T)(C)]  
That is, Risk is a Function of the relationships between Vulnerability, 
Threat, and Consequence. 
Conclusion 
The PSGP has not evolved sufficiently over the course of its existence. 
There have been occasions where programmatic changes were implemented, 
 xix
only to be eliminated in future iterations. The Fiduciary Agent, allowance for 
consortia to compete for grant funds, the grouping of ports into different tiers by 
consequent risk, flat 25% cost share for all applicants, and the requirement for 
Port-wide Risk Management Plans are prime examples. The tendency for the 
PSGP is to approach port security and resiliency as a cookie-cutter, the one-size-
fits-all program fails to acknowledge the variation between ports and that the 
MTS is a system of systems. The insistence that grants be awarded only to 
individual entities further exacerbates the disconnection between national level 
policy and the PSGP guidance.   
The PSGP can be a tremendously valuable vehicle for improving the 
overall security and resiliency of the nation’s MTS, but it has to be flexible 
enough to respond to the unique conditions of each port system competing for 
grant funding. It also must have a means for measuring the success of awarded 
proposals regarding risk bought down. The PRMP provides that metric. PRMPs 
must be a requisite part of all AMSCs and referenced in grant proposals. The 
program managers must evaluate the efficacy of awarded proposals at filling the 
security and resiliency gaps they seek to close. The PRMP provides the scale for 
that measurement.   
The Port Security Grant Program is a valuable tool for improving port 
security and resiliency. But, indeed, it can be made better. 
 xx
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The vulnerability of our critical infrastructure was made painfully apparent 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States. 
Congress established the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) in the wake of 
that realization. The security and resiliency of the nation’s ports and waterways—
its Maritime Transportation System (MTS)—is essential to our national economy 
and is complementary to our land borders and airports as controlled boundaries 
for the movement of persons and materials into and out of the United States’ 
jurisdiction. The United States has over 360 coastal and inland ports through 
which over $1.3 trillion in cargo moves annually; a safe, secure, and efficient 
MTS is critical to national security.1 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
noted that “[T]he PSGP is [intended] to provide funding to the nation’s highest 
risk port areas to support increased port-wide risk management; to enhance 
domain awareness; to train and exercise; to expand port recovery and resiliency 
capabilities; and to further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover 
from attacks involving improvised explosive devices and other nonconventional 
weapons.”2  This inquiry seeks to evaluate how well the PSGP has met those 
goals and determine if it can be improved, reorganized or has fulfilled its role and 
should be eliminated. 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
The Nation clearly recognized the criticality of the national infrastructure to 
both our physical and economic security in the wake of the 9–11 attacks. A 
series of Presidential Directives have been subsequently issued that directs the 
federal government to undertake efforts to enhance the security and resiliency of 
                                            
1 Josh Peters, “Overview of the United States Coast Guard’s Cyber Strategy and the MTS” 
(presentation, Ninth Coast Guard District, Cleveland, OH, March 29, 2016). 
2 Government Accountability Office, “Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant 
Management, and Effectiveness Measurements Should be Strengthened,” GAO-12-47, Month 
Day, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47 (accessed January 6, 2016), 1-2. 
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our critical infrastructure; the latest iteration is PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience issued February 12, 2013. PPD-21 mandates that the 
federal government work across the Departments and Agencies, in partnership 
with State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal (SLTT) jurisdictions, and in collaboration 
with the private sector. It recognizes the necessity for public-private coordination 
given that the vast majority of critical infrastructure resides in the private sector. 
PDD-21 further directs measures be taken to effectively “strengthen and 
maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure—including 
assets, networks, and systems—that are vital to public confidence and the 
Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being.”3   
The reference to “systems” is significant. The United States’ defines its 
ports and waterways as components of the Marine Transportation System 
(MTS). It is not merely a set if independent entities situated along the waterways 
that interface with ships for transportation, it is a system of components: 
businesses, communities, governmental agencies, military facilities, jurisdictions, 
intermodal links, international borders, labor, and natural resources. Much of 
American industry is located along the nation’s navigable waterways to take 
advantage of the availability of transportation, process water, co-location with 
major population centers and intermodal transportation hubs. For these same 
reasons, most U.S. power generation—which uses the conversion of water into 
steam to make electricity—is located on waterways. As pointed out by Steven 
Flynn, director of the Center for Resilience Studies and co-director of the George 
J. Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security at Northeastern University, 
responding to today’s challenges, the threats of terrorism and 
natural disasters requires the broad engagement of civil society. … 
Sustaining the United States’ global leadership and economic 
competitiveness ultimately depends on bolstering the resilience of 
its society. Periodically, things will go badly wrong. The United 
                                            
3 Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-21 (Washington, DC: The White House, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-
infrastructure-security-and-resil (accessed January 9, 2016). 
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States must be prepared to minimize the consequences of those 
eventualities and bounce back quickly.4   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States 
was confronted with the profound need to assess its security posture across all 
modes of transportation rapidly. Congress responded by establishing a series of 
grant programs, each targeting various modes of, or nexuses with, the 
transportation sector. Of those grant programs, one specifically addressed the 
gaping vulnerability presented by our expansive coastline and relatively 
unsecured ports and waterways system.  
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) provides grant funding to 
port areas for the protection of critical port infrastructure from 
terrorism. PSGP funds are primarily intended to assist ports in 
enhancing maritime domain awareness, enhancing risk 
management capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and recover 
from attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other non-conventional 
weapons, as well as training and exercises and Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation.5 
It is important to note that the nation’s ports are our primary economic 
gateway, by far outstripping all other avenues of trade. The Maritime 
Administration stated “[i]n 2011, U.S. waterborne trade (foreign and domestic) 
amounted to over 2.1 billion metric tons, up slightly from the year before. Foreign 
trade accounted for 62.5% of the total, up from 59.8% five years earlier.”6   
Over 99% of the U.S. overseas trade by weight—65% by value—is moved 
through the nation’s deep-water ports--accounting for over $3.15 trillion7 of 
                                            
4 Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Resilient Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural 
Disasters,” Foreign Affairs (2008), http://www.nyu.edu/intercep/lapietra/
Flynn_AmericatheResilient.pdf, accessed January 9, 2016.  
5 Department of Homeland Security, “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Port Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit,” May 2009, p.3 .http://www.fema.gov/
pdf/government/grant/arra/fy09_arra_psgp_guidance.pdf (accessed January 7, 2016). 
6 Maritime Administration, “2011 U.S. Water Transportation Statistical Snapshot,” November 
2013, p. 3, http://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/
US_Water_Transportation_Statistical_snapshot.pdf (accessed October 2, 2014). 
7 American Association of Port Authorities, “U.S. Public Port Facts,”, last modified 2013, 
http://www.aapa-ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1032. 
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revenue. However, before 9/11, U.S. port security was principally focused on 
preventing and deterring criminal activity through access controls and law 
enforcement intelligence for crew and cargo vetting, in particular for smuggling of 
contraband cargoes. The September 2001 terror attacks changed that. As 
practiced, pre-9/11 port security represented a gaping vulnerability in our nation’s 
security posture. Attackers could exploit ports in two ways: a direct attack on the 
port itself intended to cripple the economy where over 90% of all U.S. trade was 
transacted or as a portal for smuggling persons and materiel into the mainland. If 
the standard was to prevent criminal activity, activities in support of terrorist plots 
might go undetected. The first significant law that focused on maritime and port 
security was the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA), key provisions of 
which are: 
 Vulnerability assessments of facilities and vessels; 
 National, area, facility and vessel security plans, and facility and 
vessel incident response plans;  
 Transportation security cards—known as Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC); 
 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP); 
 Coast Guard managed programs of: 
 Regionally sited Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST); 
 Maritime Security Advisory Committees (MSAC); 
 Security Assessments of Foreign Ports (primarily fulfilled under the 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, an amendment to 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Code); 
 Vessel Automated Identification System (AIS); 
 Enhancement of Cargo and Intermodal Shipping Security.8  
The Coast Guard has been responsible for the security of the ports and 
waterways of the United States during times of war since the enactment of the 
                                            
8 Joseph F. Bouchard, Ph.D., “New Strategies to Protect America: Safer Ports for a More 
Secure Economy” (Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, 2005), 6. 
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Espionage Act of 1917. After World War II, the Magnuson Act of 1950 assigned 
the Coast Guard an ongoing mission to safeguard U.S. ports, harbors, vessels, 
and waterfront facilities from accidents, sabotage, or other subversive acts.9 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 reinvigorated the Coast Guard’s 
historical national defense mission by emphasizing Ports, Waterways and 
Coastal Security (PWCS) as the Service’s primary homeland security mission.10   
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks amplified the significance of the 
Coast Guard’s historic mission to protect the homeland. In response to the 
attacks, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was passed. Coast 
Guard Sector Commanders are the designated Federal Maritime Security 
Coordinators (FMSC) in the MTSA. The Coast Guard through the FMSC is the 
lead agency responsible for coordinating and managing national maritime 
security and response.11   
In response, the Coast Guard undertook its largest reorganization since its 
assimilation of the predecessor agencies that resulted in the creation of the U.S. 
Coast Guard. The new organization model revolves around supporting the dual 
operational missions of Prevention and Response. 
The Coast Guard PWCS mission comprises attainment of Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA), protection and restoration of the Maritime 
Transportation System (MTS); law enforcement and anti-terrorism measures; 
and response and recovery to man-made and natural disruptions to the MTS. 
The 2005 terrorist attacks on the London transit system, the 2008 Mumbai terror 
attacks from the sea, and Hurricanes KATRINA and RITA underscore the critical 
importance of preparation and planning for the PWCS mission to protect, 
respond to, and recover from events impacting the U.S. critical infrastructure and 
                                            
9 “U.S. Coast Guard, Missions, Maritime Security,” last Modified September 5, 2014, 
http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp (accessed November 02, 2014). 
10 “U.S. Coast Guard, Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security (PWCS),” last modified January 
12, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg532/pwcs.asp. 
11 “U.S. Coast Guard, Missions, Maritime Security,” last Modified September 5, 2014, 
http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp. (accessed November 02, 2014). 
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key resources (CIKR). To fulfill the PWCS mission, the Coast Guard manages a 
“systematic, maritime governance model for PWCS employs a triad consisting of 
domain awareness, maritime security regimes, and maritime security and 
response operations carried out in a unified effort by international, governmental, 
and private stakeholders.”12   
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), through the MTSA-established 
Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), guided by the Federal Maritime 
Security Coordinator (FMSC), is a component of the PWCS process of engaging 
port stakeholders to enhance the security posture of U.S. maritime domain. 
The purpose of the PSGP is to facilitate the hardening and building of 
resiliency into the nation’s port infrastructure, to protect and mitigate from 
damage caused by natural and man-made events, while also facilitating the rapid 
resumption of business, continuity of operations, and integrity of the marine 
transportation system (MTS). 
The Port Security Grant Program is part of the national strategy to 
“strengthen America’s critical infrastructure.”13  The ultimate effort seeks to 
“reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and 
hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure.”14   
The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river 
ports. While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike, 
many share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and 
land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with 
complex transportation networks designed to move cargo and 
commerce as quickly as possible. They contain not only terminals 
                                            
12 “U.S. Coast Guard, Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security (PWCS),” last modified January 
12, 2016, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg532/pwcs.asp. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program: 
Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” 2005, 1, www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/psgp/
fy05_psgp_guidance.pdf,(accessed January 7, 2016). 
14 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil (accessed October 11, 
2015). 
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where goods bound for import or export are unloaded or loaded 
onto vessels, but also other facilities critical to the nation’s 
economy, such as refineries, factories, and power plants.15   
This same vulnerability to terrorist attack makes ports, and the entire MTS, 
vulnerable to any disruptive impact, natural or man-made, intentional or 
accidental. 
The PSGP targeted constituencies are state, local, tribal, and private port 
region stakeholders. State and local law enforcement and emergency 
management agencies that serve in the nation’s ports and waterways system, 
often with co-jurisdiction and overlapping areas of operation with the U.S. Coast 
Guard,16 and sometimes each other, are eligible to compete for Port Security 
Grants. Private sector stakeholders, who own and manage over 90% of the port 
infrastructure, are also eligible to compete for PSGP funding. The greatest 
distinction between the public and private sector competition is the percentage of 
matching funds17 required for a given proposal: private entities generally must 
match 50% of the proposal while public sector applicants must match 25%.,1819  
The combined public and private sector constituencies bounded within a U.S. 
Coast Guard Sector area of operation, defines the eligible membership of the 
regional Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC).   
The PSGP has often been criticized for apparent inefficiencies, waste, 
mismanagement, ever-changing precepts and guidelines, and ever-changing 
administrators. These criticisms have led some within Congress and the 
Administration to call for eliminating the dedicated Port Security Grant Program, 
                                            
15 Government Accountability Office, “Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant 
Management, and Effectiveness Measurements Should be Strengthened,” GAO-12-47, 2012, 5, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47 (accessed January 6, 2016). 
16 The Coast Guard cannot compete for PSGP funds, nor can it directly benefit from any 
grant proposals.  
17 Requirements for grant seekers to contribute proportional matching contributions to PSGP 
project proposals varies from year to year, and may be eliminated completely during any given 
grant cycle. 
18 GAO-12-47, 30. 
19 In 2016 the cost share became a flat 25% for public and private sector applicants. 
 8
and instead incorporate port grants into a single homeland security grant 
program or merge into the existing Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants 
program. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Chertoff addressed 
the problem with the critiques during a 2007 press conference on the overarching 
Infrastructure Protection Grants Program. His concerns were that the UASI 
program covered a wide range of grants, whereas the Port Security Grant 
Program was specific to the ports. In this way, the ports would have expressly 
allocated funds to address security at our ports of entry, before the threats to 
national security via that vector entered the United States. In that same press 
conference, he addressed the stories of waste and inefficiencies: 
Predictably, we had a rash of stories, which I still read occasionally, 
about communities that spent money on leather jackets or gym 
equipment or things of that sort. And so to move away from that 
kind of willy-nilly approach, we have put in place–and I think this 
year [FY07] really affects the maturation of that process–a risk 
driven allocation of eligibility but a capabilities drive determination 
of what the actual grants are, so that we really make sure that the 
money goes for the kinds of things I think the public expects, things 
like situational awareness, cameras to show you where the risks 
are, or the tools you need in order to respond if there is an attack 
upon a ship in a port …. And I think the combination of risk driven 
eligibility but a disciplined approach to making sure the grants are 
spent on the appropriate risk-reduction efforts delivers exactly what 
the American public expects.20 
He further went on to state that those examples were in the early days of 
the post-9/11 grant programs and that “the problem … was not that there was 
fraud; it’s that the requirements were defined so broadly and so generally that 
anything that could be tied to homeland security, in theory, was eligible.” 21  A 
review of the early PSGP application guidelines confirms his assessment. 
                                            
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at a 
Press Conference on the Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Grants Program,” January 
09, 2007, 4-5. 
21 Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Press 
Conference on the Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Grants Program,” January 09, 
2007, 7. 
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At its launching, the PSGP was one of many homeland security grant 
programs that public and private constituencies saw as opportunities to offset 
their costs in complying with new laws promoting enhanced security, such as 
with the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).22 They were established 
to help offset costs, but there was an expectation that the grant funds be applied 
toward applications that would also reduce risk. 
The program is attempting to reconcile the goals of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the competitive grant 
program mandated by Congress, and risk-based direction of grant 
monies. MTSA is a nationwide security mandate that widely affects 
the maritime industry. The program is faced with the competing 
pressures of offsetting MTSA related costs while making 
competitive and risk-based grant decisions to protect the nation’s 
most critical ports and port facilities.23 
With 40 deep-water ports24 capable of at least handling PANAMAX25 
ships dotting more than 82,00026 miles of coastline, the amount of area to protect 
from infiltration is staggering. In 2010, the U.S. imported over 17.6 million TEUs27 
and exported 11.2 million TEUs, first place in imports and second place in 
exports worldwide.28   
                                            
22 “MTSA II,” a regulatory update to the MTSA that will harmonize the MTSA regulations with 
new laws since MTSA was passed, including the SAFE Port Act and ISPS Code, is currently in 
the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) process. 
23 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General. Review of the Port 
Security Grant Program (OIG-05-10). (Washington, DC: 2005), 4. 
24 AAPA number of Panamax capable ports. It is important to note that port classifications 
under the PSGP can, and often do, change.  
25 PANAMAX (ships whose dimensions are the maximum capable of transiting the Panama 
Canal). 
26 Wikipedia contributors, "List of countries by length of coastline," Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title=List_of_countries_by_length_of_coastline&oldid=692497936 (accessed 
January 10, 2016).  
27 TEU = twenty foot equivalent units, meaning the equivalent of volume of containers if all 
were uniformly shipped in 20’ by 8’ by 8’ standard freight containers. 
28 World Shipping Council, “Trade Statistics,” last modified 2014, 
http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-statistics. 
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The Center for American Progress (CAP)29 took aim at the Port Security 
Grant Program in a 2006 white paper titled “New Strategies to Protect America: 
Safer Ports for a More Secure Economy.”  Despite its obvious political animus 
towards the George W. Bush administration, the white paper authored by Joseph 
F. Bouchard, Ph.D., articulated many common frustrations with the PSGP at the 
time, and made some recommendations for overcoming those shortcomings for a 
viable, solid port security program. In it, the CAP proposed four strategies for 
improving the PSGP that would assure more secure U.S. ports and waterways 
and the economy dependent upon them. The primary focus advocated utilization 
of a risk-based methodology that melded enhanced security to buy down 
potential consequences while enhancing preparedness, resilience, and continuity 
of business. 
Specifically, those points were: 
 Revise Coast Guard maritime facility regulations to focus on the 
threat and consequence portion of the Risk Equation, rather than to 




Risk = Vulnerability X Threat X Consequence 
 
If necessary, amend the MTSA to do so: 
 Emphasize marine transportation system (MTS) risk mitigation, 
preparedness and continuity of operations to deny terrorists a 
strategic target and reduce the economic impact of attack; 
                                            
29 The CAP is a “think tank” headquartered in Washington, DC, and formerly lead by John 
Podesta. Mr. Podesta was Chief of Staff for President Clinton, and a counselor on President 
Obama’s White House Staff. 
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 Keep the PSGP, but allow for more program flexibility in the 
proposals and increase the annual appropriated funding to a 
minimum of $500M; and 
 Establish a National Port Security Trust Fund from a percentage of 
customs revenue collected.30 
Certainly, given that the ports are the “front line” of defense, from which 
the remainder of the country benefits, the ports deserve a targeted grant program 
dedicated to assisting building MTS resiliency, enhancing security, and 
establishing collaborative planning and response preparedness practices and 
relationships. By ensuring the security and resiliency of the ports, the rest of the 
county benefits by:   
 Preventing the threat from entering the country by sea in the first 
place; and  
 Protecting the economic lifeblood of the nation--the primary 
avenues of trade.   
Additionally, all of the variables in the Risk Equation should be on the 
table for consideration, as well as the validity of the Risk Equation itself, rather 
than only focusing on one or two aspects over any other. Buying down any of the 
variables will reduce the Risk potential. 
The Port Security Grant Program is part of the national strategy to 
“strengthen America’s critical infrastructure.”31  The ultimate effort seeks to 
“reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and 
hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure.”32   
 The PSGP is an outcome of the 9/11 attacks, designed to provide 
guidance and targeted, risk-based funding grants to improve the 
security and resiliency of the United States’ ports as critical 
infrastructure. 
                                            
30 Joseph F. Bouchard, Ph.D., “New Strategies to Protect America: Safer Ports for a More 
Secure Economy” (Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, 2005), 2.  
31 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program: 
Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” 2005, 1, www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/psgp/
fy05_psgp_guidance.pdf,(accessed January 7, 2016). 
32 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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 Entering assumptions for this study include: 
 The nation’s ports are critical to national security, including 
sovereignty, public safety, and economic vitality. 
 The PSGP provides essential support to improving the status quo 
of port security, but there is room for improvement 
 The nation’s ports are a potential target of terrorist attack, an 
avenue for exploiting access into the United States, and any 
disruption to port operations—whether from a natural disaster or 
man-made event—may pose grave safety and economic impact. 
 Known and potential limitations in this study include: 
 Time constraint; the available time to conduct research and 
analysis sufficient to develop a viable thesis is, by necessity, 
constraining; 
 Limited Target Population; due to time constraint, only a 
representative sample of port stakeholders will able to participate.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Port Security Grant Program is part of the national strategy to 
“strengthen America’s critical infrastructure.”33  The ultimate effort seeks to 
“reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and 
hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure.”34   
There are still many questions outstanding, such as: 
 The subject of this research is the Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP). The research assessed whether and to what degree the 
policy has been effective in attaining its stated goal of improving 
port security and resiliency, or alternative policy options would be 
more effective. 
 What does “risk-based” mean in the context of the maritime 
transportation system (MTS) as critical infrastructure? 
                                            
33 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines and Application 
Kit,”  
34 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2013). 
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 How well does the Port Security Grant Program align with the 
national policies and strategies it is intended to support7?  What 
does success or money well spent look like? 
 How can the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) be designed to 
maximize national defense, critical infrastructure protection (CIP), 
and port/MTS resiliency? 
 Is the R = (V)(T)(C) an appropriate or realistic model for assessing 
“risk” for the purpose of allocating financial resources for mitigation 
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II. RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND METHODS 
The primary focus of this study is a consideration of policy options 
analysis for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). In this effort, a combination 
of literature review, interview, and surveys methodologies was utilized. 
A thorough review of relevant literature was conducted. The topical 
content of the literature review included: 
 Foundation Doctrine—the laws, regulations, policies, and 
guidelines that define the national expectations for port security; 
 Academic Discourse—thesis, dissertations, peer-reviewed journals, 
white papers, research papers, studies, and similar documents. 
 Other Literature—Media, blogs, non-peer-reviewed journals/ 
publications, mass media. 
A. FOUNDATION DOCTRINE 
Original doctrine was reviewed to establish initial port security policy and 
expectations for the Port Security Grant Program. The study progressed through 
the PSGP evolution, and the overarching laws, policies, and regulations that 
shaped the PSGP’s focus over time, and ultimately, defined the current theater of 
operations for the PSGP. This first level of focus in the literature review is called 
Foundation Doctrine. 
B. ACADEMIC DISCOURSE 
The next targeted literary review focused on the academic literature 
dealing with port security, critical infrastructure protection (CIP), the PSGP, and 
some consideration of frameworks for evaluating port security and resiliency 
analysis, and discourse on risk and resiliency as policy determinants. This 
section, called Academic Discourse, will consisted of reviewing academic and 
research literature, professional and peer-reviewed journals, and white papers. 
This section injected analytic frameworks, critiques, and opportunities for 
consideration from observers outside of the vested stakeholders.   
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C. OTHER LITERATURE 
The final category of literature considered is the catch-all, Other Literature. 
This material is from outside of the peer-reviewed or governmental publications 
associations. These materials include the mass media, online blogs, non-peer-
reviewed journals and publications, other Internet sources (such as YouTube, 
Wikipedia, and news aggregators). 
D. SURVEYS 
A short survey with select subject matter experts (SME) was conducted. 
The survey consisted of 20 questions that are a mix of demographic questions, 
yes/no answers, multiple choice options, and seven point Likert Scale questions. 
E. INTERVIEWS 
Interviews conducted with select subject matter experts (SME). The SMEs 
are representative of the Port Security Grant Program stakeholder network. 
These include the U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA), and public and private members of Area Maritime 
Security Committees (AMSC) for selected ports. This last group includes 
maritime facility owner/operators, vessel owner/operators, shipping agencies, 
other Federal, State, and local public safety and regulatory agencies, port 
authorities, maritime exchanges, and homeland security experts. 
An analysis of the combined results of the literature review, survey, and 
interviews with subject matter experts was performed to determine to what 
degree the PSGP has succeeded in meeting its stated goal of improving port 
security and the resiliency of the MTS. The analysis sought to define more clearly 
such terms as “risk-based assessment,” “resiliency,” and “critical infrastructure.”  
Also considered is the appropriateness of Risk Equation [R = (V)(T)(C)] as a 
model for effectively determining the best course of actions for improving port 
security. Variations of, and alternatives to, the risk model are considered that 
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may be more appropriate or may supplement the Risk Equation for enhancing 
the PSGP process. 
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III. FOUNDATION DOCTRINE 
The data and evidence analyzed in this research are from topical 
literature, respondent surveys, and direct interviews of essential subject matter 
experts with the first-hand experience of stakeholders with the Port Security 
Grant Program, both program administrators, and port grant applicants. Content 
categories parse the Literature Review. 
A. FOUNDATION DOCTRINE 
The importance of protecting essential infrastructure elements became 
immediately apparent during the response to the September 11, 2001, al-Qaida 
airliner attacks. The downing of the World Trade Center (WTC) twin towers not 
only destroyed the lives of those that perished and the ones that loved them, but 
it also unleashed a cascade of massive impacts across the Nation’s 
infrastructure. Telecommunications was knocked out in lower Manhattan and 
cellular service over a much larger area. All United States ports were shut down 
and vessels ordered to remain either offshore, at berth, or anchorage. All non-
military aviation was grounded. The bridges and tunnels into and out of New York 
were closed. New York’s public safety system was overwhelmed, as well as 
suffering its horrific loss of responding heroes. 
1. U.S. Patriot Act and U.S. Homeland Security Act 
The first Act of Congress in response to the horrific attacks was passage 
and subsequent signing into law of the controversial U.S. Patriot Act of 2001. The 
term “critical infrastructure” was defined in the Patriot Act as “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
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any combination of those matters.”35  Protection of infrastructure information and 
cyber-security solidified as an essential security concern in the Patriot Act.36   
It is interesting to note that the vulnerability of our “critical infrastructure” 
was identified as a key security concern before the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
President Clinton issued PDD/NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure Protection on May 
22, 1998. In it, the Whitehouse recognized the evolving nature of what has 
become recognized as critical infrastructure vulnerability. The opening section 
presages what would become a greater national concern after the attacks: 
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based  
systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy  
and government. They include but are not limited to, 
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, 
water systems and emergency services, both governmental and 
private. Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically 
been physically and logically separate systems that had little 
interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology 
and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these 
infrastructures have become increasingly automated and 
interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities 
to equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural 
causes, and physical and cyber-attacks. Addressing these 
vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary 
approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and 
protect both domestic and international security. 
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, 
groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways 
including attacks within the United States. Because our economy is 
increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and 
information systems may be capable of significantly harming both 
our military power and our economy.”37  
 
                                            
35 U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. 5195(e) (2001). 
36 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.§101 (2002). 
37 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998), 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm (accessed January 9, 2016), 1.  
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Later, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 further defined ‘‘key resources’’ 
as those “publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal 
operations of the economy and government.”38  The President promulgated 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection on December 17, 2003, to further 
amplify the importance of critical infrastructure (CI) and key resources (KR). 
HSPD-7 made the first connections between the importance of protecting U.S. 
CIKR and adding to the discussion of prevention, protection, and security, the 
concept of resiliency.  
The most recent update to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP 2013) recognizes “security” and “resiliency” as complementary aspects of 
a thorough homeland security plan. The Executive Summary stated “[o]ur 
national well-being relies upon secure and resilient critical infrastructure—those 
assets, systems, and networks that underpin American society. To achieve this 
security and resilience, critical infrastructure partners must collectively identify 
priorities, articulate clear goals, mitigate risk, measure progress, and adapt 
based on feedback and the changing environment.”39 From the start, CIP has 
been understood to be the joint responsibility of both the public and private 
sectors; the private sector owns and manages the vast majority of CIKR, but the 
responsibility for establishing a national security strategy resides with the 
government. 
Together the public and private sector stakeholders will collaboratively 
protect, defend, and make more resilient our CIKR.  
2. Presidential Directive21/PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure and 
Resilience 
On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued Presidential Policy 
Directive 21–Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD 21). PPD-21 
                                            
38 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §101 (2002). 
39 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013, 1. 
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has further refined the importance of protecting our CIKR: “The Nation’s critical 
infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society. 
Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and maintain 
secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure–including assets, 
networks, and systems–that are vital to public confidence and the Nation’s 
safety, prosperity, and well-being.”40  At this point, the policy makers realize the 
interconnectedness and complexity of the United States’ critical infrastructure—
that it is a distributed network system, in fact, greater than that—it is a system of 
systems. The concepts of security and resiliency are now linked; resiliency is part 
of the security calculus for protecting CIKR. The policy-makers appreciation for 
our ubiquitous dependence on information technologies has also matured, with 
cyber-security an essential component of any security strategy.41   
Critical infrastructures are those systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.42 
A new concept is being brought forward; unity of effort. Unity of effort 
speaks to the cross-sector collaboration that is essential to any effective CIKR 
security strategy. No one agency, company, or interest has sole control over all 
aspects of any segment of the CIKR. Such is the nature of the system of 
systems. 
3. Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 
Making the U.S. CIKR more secure and resilient is a daunting and 
expensive undertaking. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 
sought, in part, to help offset the cost while guiding the development of strategic 
enhancements to port security through the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). 
                                            
40 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
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The MTSA was another powerful and far-reaching law passed in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001, attacks, but focused on securing the maritime vector. 
Critical elements of the MTSA related to the PSGP and port security include: 
 That threat and vulnerability assessments be conducted for U.S. 
ports and domestic and foreign commercial vessels (over 100 gross 
register tons), and concomitant security plans and security 
response plans for each; 
 Establishment of a National Maritime Security Plan and Advisory 
Committee and Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and 
Committees; 
 Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) for 
controlling access to marine facilities and vessels; 
 Coast Guard rapid response force elements capable of quick 
deployment to areas of impact or sites requiring short term 
enhanced security called Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
(MSST); 
 The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), and more maritime-
specific programs and enhancements.43 
In 2006, the MTSA was amended and certain provisions clarified and 
enhanced with the passage of the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) 
Port Act. The SAFE Port Act sought to add “risk-based funding through a 
dedicated Port Security Grant Program to harden U.S. ports against terrorist 
attacks and enhance capabilities to respond to attacks and resume operations.”44 
Other SAFE Port Act enhancements include requirements to establish joint 
federal, state, local and stakeholder command centers; procedures for 
restoration of trade and the maritime transportation system following a 
transportation security incident, deployment of nuclear and radiation detection 
capabilities at the Nation’s ports, and programs and processes for preventing 
threats from overseas. 
                                            
43 Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 Press Kit: 
Protecting America’s Ports, July 2003, 1-12. 
44 House Committee on Homeland Security, The SAFE Port Act Fact Sheet, March 2006, 1.  
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Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter H promulgates the 
MTSA implementing regulations. Subchapter H also attempts to align MTSA 
requirements with the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port 
Facilities (ISPS Code)—an amendment to the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) as SOLAS Chapter XI-2, to which the 
United States is signatory. The MTSA regulations define terms for enforcement, 
including the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Levels (MARSEC), which require 
holders of vessel and facility security plans to activate the additional security 
measures identified in their plans upon elevation of the MARSEC level. The 
MARSEC levels are shown in Figure 1.45 
 
LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
MARSEC 1 The level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times. 
MARSEC 2 
The level for which appropriate additional protective 
security measures shall be maintained for a period of 
time as a result of heightened risk of a transportation 
security incident. 
MARSEC 3 
The level for which further specific protective security 
measures shall be maintained for a limited period of 
time when a transportation security incident is probable 
or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify 
the specific target. 
Figure 1.  Description of MARSEC Levels. Source: 33 CFR §101.105. 
The Commandant of the Coast Guard sets the MARSEC Level based on 
the threat environment, although the local Captain of the Port may raise the level 
based on locally available information at COTP discretion. However, only the 
                                            
45 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “Title 33: Navigation and Navigable Waters, 
Part 101 Maritime Security: General, Subpart C-General, Records Retention, and 
Enforcement, 101.105 Definitions,” http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=06484778d56042f2ad2adb178235c8df&mc=true&node=se33.1.101_1105&rgn=div8 
(accessed January 07, 2016). 
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Commandant may lower the MARSEC Level once elevated.46  Coast Guard 
enforcement of 33 CFR Subchapter H, the Maritime Transportation Security Act, 
is under the authorities of 33 CFR Parts 6, 160 and 165. 
Regulations defining the COTP designation as Federal Maritime Security 
Coordinator (FMSC) and the attendant authorities are codified in 33 CFR §103—
Maritime Security: Area Maritime Security. This same section defines the Area 
Maritime Security Committee (AMSC), the requirements for conducting the 
MTSA-required Area Maritime Security Assessments (AMSA), and the 
development of Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP). Elements of each include 
in part are described in Figure 2. 
 
                                            
46 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “Title 33: Navigation and Navigable Waters, Part 
101 Maritime Security: General, Subpart B-Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels,  
101.200 MARSEC Levels,” http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=06484778d56042f2ad2adb178235c8df&mc=true&node=se33.1.101_1200&rgn=div8 




The COTP for a given Coast Guard Sector will be the 
FMSC. The FMSC is responsible for establishing and 
overseeing an AMSC, appointment of its membership, 
and direct development of the AMSP. 
AMSC 
The AMSC will operate under a written charter per 33 
CFR §103.300, comprised of federal, territorial, state, 
Tribal, and local public safety, law enforcement, and 
crisis management agencies, the maritime industry, 
other port stakeholders and have clear background 
investigations. Terms of service will be no greater than 
five years. 
AMSC responsibilities include identification of CIKR, 
identification of port risks (i.e., threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences), determination of mitigation 
measures and strategies, assist with the development of 
the AMSP, help communicate MARSEC level changes 
and dissemination of port security information. 
AMSA The AMSC will ensure completion of a risk-based AMSA per 33 CFR §103.310, §101.510 and §103.405. 
AMSP 
The AMSP should address MARSEC changes, 
defensive measures to prevent contraband security 
smuggling, unauthorized access to secure locations, 
transportation security incident (TSI) reporting 
procedures, CIKR protection, response to alerts 
procedures, suspicious activity report handling, and 
more. 
Also addressed in the AMSP are plan exercise and 
recordkeeping provisions. 
Figure 2.  Elements of Regulations. Source: 33 CFR §103. 
4. U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Inspection Circulars (NVIC) 
The publication of regulations always generates anxiety, confusion, and 
often additional cost for the regulated communities. The rapid-fire pace of new 
security-related regulations in response to the 2001 attacks exacerbated those 
challenges. To mitigate the concern and expedite compliance, the Coast Guard 
issued a series of Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVIC) that clarify 
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compliance with the new laws and their regulations. The prime series of MTSA 
implementation NVICs are: 
 NVIC 04–02: Security for passenger vessels and passenger 
terminals. 
 NVIC 09–02: Guidelines for the development of area maritime 
security committees and area maritime security plans required for 
U.S. Ports.  
 NVIC 10–02: Security guidelines for vessels.  
 NVIC 11–02: Recommended security guidelines for facilities.  
 NVIC 03–03: Implementation Guidance for the Regulations 
Mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
(MTSA) for Facilities. 
 NIVC 04–03: Guidance for verification of vessel security plans on 
domestic vessels by the regulations mandated by the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Regulations and International 
Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) code. 
 NVIC 05–03: Implementation Guidance for the Maritime Security 
Regulations Mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
of 2002 for Outer Continental Shelf Facilities. 
 NVIC 10–04: Guidelines for Handling of Sensitive Security 
Information (SSI), parts 1 and 2. 
 NVIC 12–04:  Maritime security compliance and enforcement for 
the U.S./Canadian boundary and coastal waters. 
 NVIC 02–05:  International Port Security (ISP) Program. 
 NVIC 03–07: Guidance for the implementation of the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program in the Maritime 
Sector. 
 NVIC 01–13: Inspection and Certification of Vessels Under the 
Maritime Security Program (MSP) 
Of essential interest here is NVIC 09–02, Guidelines for the development 
of area maritime security committees and area maritime security plans required 
for U.S. Ports. It is a 218-page tome that addresses each of the new initiatives 
mandated in the combined MTSA and SAFE Port Act specific to the newly 
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created Area Maritime Security Committees and their chartered responsibilities, 
as well as providing unifying definitions of terms for performing the AMS 
Assessments and developing the AMSPs for their geographic region. The 
overarching goal of the AMSC is the institutionalization of “[c]ollaborative 
planning, coordination, open lines of communication, strong working 
relationships, and unity of effort are essential to provide an effective systems 
approach to preventing, detecting, responding, and recovering from terrorist 
threats to the MTS.”47  NVIC 09–02 goes into great detail on: 
 What skill sets the AMSC needs;  
 The proper handling of sensitive security information (SSI);  
 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII);  
 Conducting the AMS Assessments and use of the Coast Guard’s 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM);  
 The concepts of “Maritime Common Operating Picture (MCOP)”; 
and 
 AMS Exercises (including the Area Maritime Security Training and 
Exercise Program or AMSTEP).48   
In particular, it is the AMSCs that provide input and “technical support for 
evaluation of port security grant proposals in support of AMSPs.”49  In most 
cases, it is AMSC members that are competing for the PSGP funds. NVIC 09–02 
provides the first deeper explanation of the Coast Guard’s MSRAM tool in 
describing how to build a viable AMSP:  
The first step in developing and maintaining the AMSP is 
completing or revalidating an Area Maritime Security Assessment. 
The most current and valid port and facility data should be entered 
into the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM), which 
then uses the data to calculate relative risk based on the Coast 
Guard Risk-Based Decision Making (RBDM) methodology (using a 
                                            
47 U.S. Coast Guard, “NVIC 09-02: Guidelines for development of area maritime security 
committees and area maritime security plans required for U.S. Ports.,” 2002, 3. 
48 U.S. Coast Guard, “NVIC 09-02, 3-4. 
49 Ibid., 4. 
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“Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence” algorithm). Each of the 
components of the formula is broken down into multiple 
benchmarks with weighted numerical values. The MSRAM analysis 
results in a scenario-based Risk Index Number (RIN) that can be 
used to formulate the ranking of assets within a port or jurisdiction, 
and support the development or updating of AMS Assessments as 
required by 33 CFR § 101.510, § 103.400, § 103.410, and § 
103.510.50  
5. National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) 
Area Maritime Security Plans are designed around the MARSEC tiered 
system. As MARSEC level moves up from Level 1 to 2, and ultimately 3, the 
security posture for the vessel or facility covered by the AMSP is elevated to 
match the potential for a transportation security incident (TSI). It is important to 
note that the AMSP is a component of the National Response Framework 
(NRF)51 and must be consistent with the NRF, and harmonized with the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). 
6. National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) 
A slew of national strategies and plans were published after September 
11, 2001, and focused on providing guidance and structure to our national 
preparedness posture. The emphasis was on hardening, making more resilient, 
and pre-identifying courses of action, processes, and procedures for preventing 
deterring, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from natural or man-made 
disasters. The intention is to provide a clear framework for establishing national 
security strategies and practices. Those that bear most directly on port security 
are:52 
                                            
50 Ibid., Appdx2-1. 
51 The National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the National Response Plan (NRP) as 
the national level contingency model for responding to All-Hazards events utilizing the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS). 
52 National Security Presidential Directive–NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive HSPD-13— Maritime Security Policy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2004), 
http://fas.or/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf (accessed January 30, 2016). 
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 National Strategy for Maritime Security  
 National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness 
 Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan  
 Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan  
 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy  
 Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan 
 Maritime Transportation System Security Plan 
 Maritime Commerce Security Plan 
 Domestic Outreach Plan 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) depends upon the 
execution of eight Plans/Strategies that in concert fulfill the directive promulgated 
by National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13): National Maritime Security Policy. Together, 
they form the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The constituent 
Plans/Strategies of the NSMS, while all interrelate with one another to 
accomplish the whole of national maritime security, can be grouped by three task 
focus areas:  Situational Awareness, Prevention and Response, and External 
Communications, illustrated in Figure 3 from the NSMS. The goal of the NSMS is 
to be alert for potential, thwart, respond to, and if all else fails, to rapidly recover 
from a Transportation Security Incident (TSI).53 
 Situational Awareness:  The Plans/Strategies that the comprise the 
Situational Awareness area are the Global Maritime Intelligence 
Integration Plan, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness, and the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan 
(MOTR).54 
                                            
53 “Transportation security incident (TSI) means a security incident resulting in a significant 
loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a 
particular area,” 33 CFR §101.105. 
54 The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan’s (MOTR) contents are classified and 
can only be alluded to in broad generalities in this thesis. 
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 External Communications:  The two Plans/Strategies that most 
directly concern external communications are the International 
Outreach Strategy to Enhance Maritime Security, and the Domestic 
Outreach Plan. 
 Prevention and Response: The final Plans/Strategies grouping 
whose focus is on prevention and response are the Maritime 
Transportation Systems Security Plan, the Maritime Commerce 
Security Plan, and the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan. 
 
 
Figure 3.  NSMS Situational Awareness, Prevention and Response, and 
External Communications. Source: National Strategy for Maritime Security.   
 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) aligns with—
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5): Management of Domestic 
Incidents; HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection; Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness; and 
PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. The NSMS is part of a 
constellation of systems, strategies, and plans that provide a framework for the 
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preparedness continuum of [planning], “prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery”55 to “incidents of national significance”56 in fulfilling the 
National Preparedness Goal. Complementary and associated with the NSMS are 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the components of the 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG):57 
 National Preparedness System 
 National Incident Management System  
 National Planning Framework 
 National Prevention Framework  
 National Mitigation Framework  
 National Response Framework  
 National Disaster Recovery Framework  
These components enable fulfillment of the thirty-two NPG core 
capabilities, grouped into five mission areas—many core capabilities fall within 
multiple mission areas, whereas some support only one. Each mission area—
Planning, Prevention, Mitigation, Response, and Disaster Recovery—has its own 
National Framework (see above).   
  
                                            
55 Federal Emergency Management Agency. “FEMA Information Sheet: National 
Preparedness Goal, Second Edition,” FEMA.gov, 1, http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-
goal (accessed December 10, 2015). 
56 NOTE: When the National Response Plan was superseded by the National Framework, 
the term “incident of national significance” was eliminated. DHS, “What’s New in the National 
Response Framework,” DHS.gov, 2, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/whatsnew.pdf, 
January 22, 2008 (accessed December 10, 2015). 
57 Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8—National Preparedness (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness 
(accessed October 11, 2015). 
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The core capabilities of the NPG mission areas are highlighted in Figure 4. 
 
Core Capability Mission Core Capability Mission 
Planning All Operational Coordination All 
Public Information & Warning All Forensics & Attribution Prevention 
Intelligence & Info Sharing Prevention 
Protection 
Interdiction & Disruption Prevention 
Protection 
Screening, Search & Detection Prevention 
Protection 
Access Control & Identity 
Verification 
Protection 
Cyber-security Protection Physical Protective 
Measures 
Protection 
Risk Mgmt for Protection 
Programs & Activities 
Protection Supply Chain Integrity & 
Security 
Protection 
Community Resilience Mitigation Long-Term Vulnerability 
Reduction 
Mitigation 
Risk & Disaster Resilience 
Assessment 
Mitigation Threats & Hazards 
Identification 
Mitigation 
Critical Transportation Response Environmental 
Response/Health & Safety 
Response 
Fatality Management Services Response Fire Management & 
Suppression 
Response 
Infrastructure Systems Response 
Recovery 
Logistics & Supply Chain 
Mgmt 
Response 
Mass Care Services Response Mass Search & Rescue 
Operations 
Response 
On-Scene Security, Protection, 




Public Health, Healthcare, & 
Emergency Medical Services 
Response Situational Assessment Response 
Economic Recovery Recovery Health & Social Services Recovery 
Housing Recovery Natural & Cultural 
Resources 
Recovery 
Figure 4.  Core Capabilities of the NPG Mission. Source: NPG Core 







 Figure 5 further frames the core capabilities of the National Preparedness 
System with the mission targets. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Core Capabilities of the National Preparedness System. Source: 
National Preparedness System. 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) plans are part of the 
National Preparedness System (NPS) National Response Framework (NRF) and 
required to be compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
Therefore, all plans must fully utilize the Incident Command System (ICS) 
structures and align with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
Figure 6 is a plan map that details the interrelationships between the linked 
plans, strategies, and frameworks that unify the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security within the National Preparedness System. From the NPS and legislated 
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), the Area Maritime Security 
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Committees (AMSC) are mandated. The AMSCs conduct the Area Maritime 
Security Assessments that the Area Maritime Security Plans address. The MTSA 
also mandates the development of Vessel Security Plans (VSP) and Facility 
Security Plans (FSP). Each step is a building block for national security, 
reinforced one by the other. Figure 6 illustrates the relationships between local 
and national plan under the National Response Plan (since revised and renamed 
the National Response Framework). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan–Plan Relationship Map. 
Source: National Strategy for Maritime Security: The Maritime Infrastructure 
Recovery Plan 2006. 
The NSMS Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations 
(MTSSR) establishes a “systems-oriented security regime built upon layers of 
protection and defense,” acknowledging the complexity of the MTS as a system-
of-systems.58  The systems within the MTS noted by the MTSSR are: 
                                            
58 Department of Homeland Security. “National Strategy for Maritime Security–Maritime 
Transportation System Security Recommendations,” 3, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
HSPD_MTSSPlan.pdf. (accessed January 30, 2016). 
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 Component Security—measures to protect the port’s physical 
components, including vessels, vehicles, cargo, terminals, facilities, 
and other physical port infrastructure.  
 Interface Security—measures to make secure intermodal 
interfaces. 
 Information Security—measures to protect data systems and 
information technologies to include cyber security.  




VISION FOR MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
SECURITY 
 
A systems-oriented security regime built upon layers of protection 
and defense in-depth that effectively mitigates critical system 
security risks, while preserving the functionality and efficiency of the 
MTS. Understanding the most effective security risk management 
strategies involves cooperation and participation of both domestic 
and international stakeholders acting at strategic points in the 
system, the U.S. seeks to improve security through a cooperative 
and cohesive effort involving all stakeholders.60 
 
 
The maritime transportation system as a system of systems is graphically 
displayed in Figure 7. 
                                            
59 Ibid., 2. 
60 Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 7.  A Systems View of the MTS61  Source:  National Strategy for 
Maritime Security–Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations. 
The MTSSR proposes eight strategic recommendations. These include 
recognition that all stakeholders—public and private sectors—must coalesce to 
develop holistic strategies to improve the security and resiliency of the MTS. 
Many of the recommendations are resolved while others remain constantly 
relevant. The MTSSR recommends application of the following:  
(1) Risk management approach,  
(2) Protection of critical data and security information,  
(3) Concurrent enforcement of national and international security 
regulations—MTSA and ISPS,  
                                            
61 DHS, “National Strategy for Maritime Security–Maritime Transportation System Security 
Recommendations,” C-1. 
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(4) actively engaging stakeholders for collaborative and coordinated 
efforts to reduce security risks,  
(5) deployment of port access credentials—Transportation Workers’ 
Identity Card (TWIC),  
(6) audit existing safety frameworks for opportunities to gain security 
synergies,  
(7) promote development and deployment of port security 
technologies, and finally,  
(8) ensure proper maritime security training of port and maritime 
personnel.62 
Figure 8 is the Concept Schematic for the Maritime Transportation System 
Security Plans Architecture.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Concept Schematic. Source:  National Strategy for Maritime 
Security–Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations. 
                                            
62 DHS, “National Strategy for Maritime Security–Maritime Transportation System Security 
Recommendations,” 4-13. 
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7. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
The 2013 edition of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 
titled Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, brings upfront 
in the CIKR protection equation the importance of building resiliency into the 
planning process. The concept of resiliency is also fundamental to the Vision, 




A Nation in which physical and cyber critical infrastructure remain 
secure and resilient, with vulnerabilities reduced, consequences 




Strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure, by managing physical and cyber risks through the 




Assess and analyze threats to, vulnerabilities of, and consequences 
to critical infrastructure to inform risk management activities;  
Secure critical infrastructure against human, physical, and cyber 
threats through sustainable efforts to reduce risk, while accounting 
for the costs and benefits of security investments;  
Enhance critical infrastructure resilience by minimizing the adverse 
consequences of incidents through advanced planning and 
mitigation efforts, and employing effective responses to save lives 
and ensure the rapid recovery of essential services;  
Share actionable and relevant information across the critical 
infrastructure community to build awareness and enable risk-
informed decision making; and  
Promote learning and adaptation during and after exercises and 
incidents.  
Figure 9.   Statements of the NIPP. Source: DHS, National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (2013). 
 
                                            
63 Department of Homeland Security. “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013,” 5, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/National-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-
508.pdf. (accessed January 30, 2016). 
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The NIPP 2013 refers to PPD-21 for the definition of resilience as “the 
ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover 
rapidly from disruptions … [it] includes the ability to withstand and recover from 
deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.”64  Good 
intelligence and analysis of risk are essential to being able to identify resiliency 
building measures. Resilient infrastructure must be not only robust but also 
flexible enough to adapt to events. Planning efforts that address mitigation, 
response and recovery strategies are all inputs to building resiliency into 
infrastructure.65 
Resiliency is viewed as part of the security continuum, from protective 
measures to defend against disruptive impact, to the diffusing of vulnerability to 
be more resilient and recover more quickly from an impactful event. Figure 10 
from the NIPP 2013 illustrates this relationship between protection and resiliency 
on the security continuum.66   
                                            
64 Presidential Directive / PPD-21–Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
65 DHS, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013,” 7. 
66 DHS, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013,” 19. 
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Figure 10.  Security-Resilience Relationships. Source: NIPP 2013. 
The NIPP 2013 emphasizes the importance of public-private sector 
partnerships in designing solutions for CIKR protection and resiliency. One 
organizational vehicle to meet the NIPP Goal is the Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers. ISACs are sector owner/operator managed intelligence centers 
that provide real-time data gathering, analysis, and dissemination of sector-
relevant threat analysis, incident reporting, and risk warning. The ISACs have the 
ability to purge proprietary information from reports to share with stakeholders 
within and across sectors, as well as with the government.67 Many of the 18 
recognized CIKR Sectors have ISACs; within the transportation sector is a 
maritime ISACs—the Maritime Security Council. The maritime ISAC should be 
more fully engaged in port security and could prove an extremely valuable tool 
for building maritime resiliency, port security, and MDA. 
                                            
67 DHS, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013,” 38. 
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Each Sector has a Sector Specific Plan (SSP). Figure 11 provides the 
Transportation Sector’s Vision, Mission, and Goals statement from the NIPP 




A secure and resilient transportation system, enabling 
legitimate travelers and goods to move without significant 




Continuously improve the risk posture of transportation 
systems serving the Nation. 
Goals 
 
Prevent and deter acts of terrorism using, or against, the 
transportation system;  
Enhance the all-hazard preparedness and resilience of the 
global transportation system to safeguard U.S. national 
interests;  
Improve the effective use of resources for transportation 
security; and  
Improve sector situational awareness, understanding, and 
collaboration. 
Figure 11.  NIPP Mission Statement and Goals. Source: NIPP 2013, 
Transportation Sector SSP. 
The NIPP 2013 Transportation Sector SSP explicitly updated the Risk 
Model, with two variants: “Risks to the transportation system, and risks from the 
transportation system.”69  The first case modifies the former “threat” variable and 
now defines it as the “probability” that something may occur. It also defines risk 
as a function of that probability and the likely consequences, expressed as:  
Risk = ƒ (Probability, Consequence) 
                                            
68 Adapted from DHS, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013 Transportation Sector 
Specific Plan,” https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-transportation-
systems-2015-508.pdf (accessed January 30, 2016). 
69 Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013 
Transportation Sector Specific Plan,” https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-
transportation-systems-2015-508.pdf (accessed January 30, 2016). 
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The second equation assumes that the transportation systems itself, or 
elements of it, are weaponized and used against other targets. This second 
equation slightly modifies the traditional Risk Equations by, instead of multiplying 
Threat by Vulnerability by Consequence to determine the Risk, Risk is now 
considered a function of the three, notated in the following: 
Terrorist risks do not have a statistical basis for determining 
probability; therefore, the following alternate equation, developed 
by the Government Accountability Office in 2001, is typically used 
within the sector: 
 
Risk = ƒ (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence)70 
 
8. Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) Guidance 
Each year the PSGP administrator, currently the DHS-FEMA Grant 
Programs Directorate (GPD) is the administrator for the PSGP. For each fiscal 
year, the GPD announces the grants’ open period with the publication of a Notice 
of Funding Opportunity (NOFO). Within the NOFO are the precepts, or 
guidelines, that applicants must follow in submitting grants proposals. The 
Guidelines state such things as eligibility criteria, application deadlines, 
submission procedures, and the application content (e.g., justifications, details, 
attestations, budget, and specifics of the proposal). The Guidelines also define 
what projects are eligible for funding, what the objectives and priorities for 
funding are for the current period, any cost-share provisions, and the details of 
specific supporting documentation that must accompany a complete proposal.71   
Proposals go through a multi-step review process to ensure eligibility and 
determine the rank ordering of priority for awarding grant funding. The process is:  
                                            
70 DHS, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013 Transportation Sector Specific Plan,” 
4. 
71 Department of Homeland Security. “Notice of Funding Opportunity Fiscal Year 2015 Port 
Security Grant Program (PSGP),” 1-17, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1429282564066-
3b452acb7dc7a2f1460a15ed855547d9/FY2015PSGP_NOFO_v2.pdf. (accessed January 7, 
2016. 
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(1) First level review by FEMA GPD for eligibility and suitability—
determine if the proposal meets the minimal requirements for 
consideration;  
(2) COTP/AMSC Field Review—Then the AMSC provides the COTP 
with a preferred rank ordering of proposals, with the COTP making 
final judgments and recommendations as the Federal Maritime 
Security Coordinator (FMSC) to the next level of review;  
(3) National Review Panel—The proposal is forwarded up, with priority 
recommendations, to Coast Guard Headquarters and FEMA for 
national level review; finally,  
(4) DHS Headquarters makes a determination on final ranking and 
grant awards using risk-based review against the top-tier National 
Strategies and policy.   
After the final review, a recommendation is made by FEMA to the DHS 
Secretary, who is the final approval authority for awarding grant funds to the 
winning proposal applicants.72 
The PSGP process assumes a 360° cycle, with post-award reviews, 
lessons learned applied to developing the next fiscal year’s PSGP Guidelines, 
and it starts over again. Over the life of the PSGP, there have been numerous 
changes. The grant administrator has changed three times, with the program 
residing for the longest duration within FEMA GPD, which currently retains 
administration. Other changes have been:  a period of performance, eligibility 
criteria, project inclusions and exclusions, funding amounts, cost share 
requirements, port groupings, whether or not a fiduciary agent is required or if 
applications can come from consortiums, the specific areas of focus for the term, 




                                            
72 DHS, “Notice of Funding Opportunity Fiscal Year 2015 Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP),” 17–28. 
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Figure 12 graphically represents the PSGP annual cycle. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Port State Control Grant Process. Source: Notice of Funding 
Opportunity Fiscal Year 2015 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). 
The PSGP has undergone some changes over its lifetime. Originally the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Domestic Preparedness 
(ODP)73 managed the PSGP as the 2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP).  “Although administered by the ODP, the 
UASI Port Security Grant Program [was] coordinated by the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA).”74  That first year the PSGP focused on providing 
                                            
73 ODP transferred to Department of Homeland Security from the Department of Justice in 
2003. 
74 Department of Homeland Security, “The Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative 
Port Security Grant Program,” http://ojp.gov/archives/solicitations/docs/fy03uasi_psg.pdf 
(accessed January 10, 2016). 
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funding for only 14 specific ports and 14 specific expenditures:75  See Figure 13 
for the initial PSGP Ports and Eligible Expenditures published in the FY 2003 
UASI Port Security Grant Program Notice of Financial Offer (NOFO). 
 
Eligible Ports Eligible Expenditures 
New York/New Jersey Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
Los Angeles/Long Beach Explosive Device Mitigation & Remediation Equipment 
Seattle CBRNE76 Search & Rescue Equipment 
Hampton Roads Interoperable Communications Equipment 
Miami Detection Equipment 
Houston Decontamination Equipment 
Philadelphia Physical Security Enhancement Equipment 
New Orleans Terrorism Incident Prevention Equipment 
Beaumont CBRNE Logistical Support Equipment 
Charleston CBRNE Incident Response Vehicles 
Port Canaveral Medical Supplies & Limited Types of Pharmaceuticals 
San Juan CBRNE Reference Materials 
Valdez Patrol Vehicles, including Watercraft 
Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port (LOOP) 
TSA Compliant Employee Identification 
Card System (i.e., TWIC77) 
Figure 13.  Initial PSGP Ports and Eligible Expenditures. Source:  FY 2003 
UASI Port Security Grant Program NOFO. 
The total funds available for assignment to successful proposals was 
$75,000,000. There was no matching requirement. Grantees were required to 
                                            
75 Adapted from DHS, “The Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative Port Security 
Grant Program,” http://ojp.gov/archives/solicitations/docs/fy03uasi_psg.pdf (accessed January 
10, 2016). 
76 CBRNE = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive. 
77 TWIC = Transportation Worker Identification Credential. 
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post financial status and program progress reports during the grant performance 
period. The private sector was ineligible to apply. 
By 2005, the PSGP was a stand-alone grant program within the 
overarching suite of Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP), now managed 
by DHS’ Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 
(SLGCP), Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The pot of money for 
distribution to successful PSGP proposal doubled to $150,000,000.78 The PSGP 
Guidance aligned with the National Preparedness Goal established by Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), which required that the PSGP align 
with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and utilize the National 
Planning Scenarios,79 the Universal Task List (UTL),80 and Target Capabilities 
List (TCL).81  The 2005 PSGP Guidelines increased the number of eligible ports 
to 6682 and opened the competition up to private sector facilities and U.S. 
inspected vessels regulated by the MTSA, port authorities, and consortia 
comprised of either to also include port associations.83  The risk-based 
allocations identified the ports to get funding using the Risk Equation (R = 
V*T*C),84 the port areas were to choose the five best proposals for consideration 
by DHS.85 Private sector stakeholders also had to provide 50% of the proposal 
cost. There were no matching funds required of public sector stakeholders. For 
                                            
78 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP): Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” Forward, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/
government/grant/psgp/fy05_psgp_guidance.pdf (accessed January 7, 2016). 
79 There are 15 National Planning Scenarios—12 Terrorist Attack Scenarios, 2 Natural 
Disaster Scenarios, and 1 Pandemic Disease Scenarios. The Scenarios are used as frameworks 
for developing planning strategies to protect against. 
80 The UTL are the tasks necessary to execute responses to the National Planning 
Scenarios at all levels of government. 
81 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP): Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit,” 1. (The TCL is a set of 36 capabilities necessary to perform the UTL.) 
82 Ibid., 2. 
83 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2005 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP): Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit,” 5. 
84 Ibid., 3. 
85 Ibid. 7. 
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Figure 14.  Source: PSGP FY 2005, 36 Target Capabilities List Critical 
Capabilities. 
In 2006, the funds level remained almost steady at $168,000,000. The 
PSGP was now administered by the Office of Grants and Training under the new 
Preparedness Directorate within DHS.86  Grant proposals need to address the 
National Priorities cited in the National Preparedness Goal. The main focus for 
this iteration was on establishing means to defeat attacks with improvised 
explosive devices (IED).87  The number of eligible ports was now up to 101, as 
                                            
86 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2006 Infrastructure Protection Program: 
Port Security, Program Guidelines and Application Kit,” Forward, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/
government/grant/psgp/fy06_psgp_guidance.pdf. (accessed January 7, 2016). 
87 Ibid., 2. 
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well as previously available to MTSA regulated facilities and U.S. inspected 
vessels, port consortia, and port authorities. Matching funds were required, with 
public sector stakeholders having to provide 25% of the proposal cost and private 
sector stakeholders having to provide 50% of the proposal cost. 
The Fiscal Year 2007 PSGP Guidelines brought the grant program into 
compliance with the SAFE Port Act, expanding the group of eligible applicants to 
“all entities covered by an Area Maritime Security Plan (AMSP).”88  In 2007, port 
areas were assessed risk profiles and identified by “tier,”89 from Tier I through 
Tier IV, with Tier I being the highest risk.90  The funding distinction allocated a set 
amount that each successful applicant within Tier I ports would be eligible for, 
and with Tier II through Tier IV ports competing for the pool of funds designated 
for their respective Tiers.91 
By FY2007, FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate (GPD) was responsible 
for administering all Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP), including the 
PSGP.92  GPD opened avenues for “applicants to have consultations with the 
Department’s grant program and subject matter experts.”93 The period of 
performance was established at 36 months, with the “largest portion of the port 
grant dollars … awarded to the highest risk facilities and for projects that offer the 
maximum return on investment for risk reduction.”94 
                                            
88 Ibid., i. 
89 The term “Port Tiers” is later changed to “Port Groups” in FY2008. 
90 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2006 Infrastructure Protection Program: Port Security, Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit,” 1. 
91 Ibid., 2–3. 
92 Administration of the PSGP changed four times before residing in FEMA’s GPD. GPD was 
determined by DHS to be the natural administrator for Departmental preparedness grants. The 
frequent transfer of the PSGP is largely an artifact of a newly formed and rapidly evolving 
Department of Homeland Security. 
93 DHS, “Fiscal Year 2006 Infrastructure Protection Program: Port Security, Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit,” i. 
94 Ibid.  
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The FY2007 PSGP Guidelines emphasize target projects that increase 
“port-wide risk management, enhanced domain awareness, capabilities to 
prevent, detect, respond to and recover from attacks involving improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and other non-conventional weapons, as well as 
training and exercises.”95 
Table 1 breaks down the primary similarities and changes between the 
remaining annual iterations of the PSGP Guidelines from FY2008 to FY20115. 
 
 
Table 1.   FY2008 through FY2015 PSGP Funding Guidelines. 
                                            
95 Ibid., 1. 
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9. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Audits 
Feedback for any endeavor is essential to improvement; external 
feedback from a neutral third party is even better. The United State Government 
Accountability Office has filled this role well throughout the life of the Port 
Security Grant Program, filing many reports that critique and offer corrective 
actions or additional areas for improvement in the PSGP. Over the almost 
decade and a half of the PSGP and the attendant GAO reports, there have been 
significant critiques and observed improvements in response. The GAO is 
politically neutral in their reports to Congress, providing succinct and value-added 
recommendations that, in turn, the Executive agencies (i.e., DHS, FEMA, USCG) 
have embraced for action and employed programmatic improvements to address 
the GAO critiques and recommendations to the degree they are capable.96   
One recurring theme in the GAO reports cited the need to improve the risk 
equation, in particular about the vulnerability variable to account for differences 
between ports and changes due to enhancements, including those from PSGP 
grants.97  In particular, GAO noted that the port security models being used to 
determine grant allocations did not account for reduced risk from funding prior 
grant proposals. Therefore, future port risk assessments cannot adjust for any 
improvement in a port’s risk profile. No metric is available to measure the change 
in port risk profile. The absence of the ability to measure the effect of inputs—risk 
reduced from measures implemented since the prior port assessment—calls into 
question the accuracy of successive assessments.98   
There frequently was concern about oversight and accountability to follow 
through on grantees fulfillment of the winning proposals, especially within the 
period of performance. Particularly frustrating for the GAO was the inability of 
                                            
96 GAO-12-47, 15–20. 
97 Ibid., 20. 
98 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges with 
Selected Port Security Programs, Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security 
and Justice, GAO 14-636T (Washington, DC, 2012), 10, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
663784.pdf (accessed January 6, 2016). 
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FEMA to be aware of duplicative grant proposals across the suite of Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) grants (e.g., PSPG, UASI, and Transit Security 
Grants). Similarly, many proposals were designed so that their success was 
dependent upon winning multiple grants, such as a PSGP grant, a UASI grant, 
and perhaps a Firefighters Grant Program so that failure to successfully win all 
three grants would cause the entire project to fail.99 The first concern relates to 
grantees getting double funding for a grant proposal.100  The GAO suggests the 
grantees may hedge their bets by taking advantage of all opportunities. The other 
concern relates to large, complex proposals that have components of the 
proposal dependent upon the grantee winning grants from different sources.101  
The unease resolves around the risk of project failure if the project is 
unsuccessful in its bid for one or more of the dependent grants, leaving unspent 
funds that were unobligated for the successful grant applications. Both are 
legitimate problems to be solved.  
In 2006, following Hurricanes KATRINA and RITA, the GAO 
recommended “DHS apply an all-hazards, risk management approach in 
deciding whether and how to invest in specific capabilities” for grant proposals.102  
Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness (PPD-8), required the 
establishment of a National Preparedness Goal and a National Preparedness 
System.103 
                                            
99 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing 
National Capabilities: Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA’s Progress, Statement of William O. 
Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice, GAO 12-526T (Washington, DC, 2012) 4-
11, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589446.pdf (accessed January 6, 2016). 
100 GAO 13-637T, 5. 
101 GAO 12-526T, 8.  
102 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO 06-618 (Washington, DC, 2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06618.pdf (accessed January 6, 2016). 
103 Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8—National Preparedness (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness 
(accessed October 11, 2015). 
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GAO expressed concern over a FEMA proposal for consolidating the 
disparate preparedness grants in its portfolio in the FY13 Presidential Budget 
Request to Congress. The goal was to simplify oversight and eliminate the 
potential for “double-dipping” or applying to multiple grants for the same 
proposal, or even depend upon multiple grants to complete a large project that is 
beyond the scope of any single grant. This proposal never became law but 
continues to be discussed.104  
A final long-standing problem that the GAO has had with PSGP 
administration is with the frequency of the failure of grantees to meet the required 
milestones for disbursement of funds, leaving grant money tied up and 
unappropriated, while the clock runs down during the performance period.105 
10. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Much of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)106 reports providing 
contextual information with course of action (COA) options for Congress to 
consider. In this regard, the CRS reports provide outstanding detail in insight into 
the history, definitions, details, and evolution of the program under review, as 
well as providing a set of options for improving them. The CRS reports provide 
perspective and a point of reference. 
CRS Report “The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment 
Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress” (CRS RL33858) 
describes two relevant artifacts of risk:  risk management and risk inheritance. 
Risk management is “a continual process or cycle in which risks are identified 
and monitored to see how they perform, with a continual feedback loop for 
decision-maker input to improve countermeasures and consider tradeoffs 
                                            
104 GAO 12-526T, 11. 
105 GAO-12-47, 23-35. 
106 The CRS is a research service of the U.S. Library of Congress. 
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between risk acceptance and avoidance.”107  Risk inheritance refers to that risk 
assumed due to proximity to another at-risk entity. An example would be that a 
residential area outside the gates of a chemical facility would inherit risk from the 
facility; should a hazardous incident occur at the facility, it would impact the 
nearby community as well. Both of these concepts are directly applicable, and 
should be integrated into the process for assessing Port Security Grant 
proposals. 
Another very interesting issue raised in CRS RL33858 is the quote from 
Secretary Chertoff that “federal homeland security assistance should not remain 
a program for general revenue sharing. It should supplement state and local 
resources based on the risks or vulnerabilities that merit additional support.”108 
The report queries (a) whether grantees have come to view grants as 
entitlements; (b) if the PSGP could be discontinued at some point in time; and, 
(c) if metrics for determining if grant funds were being used as intended.109  The 
report also alludes to finding synergies where the differing grant programs could 
share benefits, such as better intelligence sharing and analysis.110 
CRS Report “Critical Infrastructure Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and 
Programs and Issues for Congress” (CRS R42683) suggests that the homeland 
security of critical infrastructure should advance from the defensive posture of 
infrastructure protection to the adaptive posture of building resiliency. Citing the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council’s 2006 Report of the Critical Infrastructure 
Task Force, protection of critical infrastructure is seen as being a brittle strategy, 
whereas resiliency recognizes that adverse events may occur—some that may 
not be avoidable—but that building resiliency into critical infrastructure would 
                                            
107 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Department of 
Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for 
Congress, by Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins. CRS RL33858, 2007, 16 (accessed 
November 15, 2015 at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf).  
108 CRS RL33858, 2007, 27.  
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 28.  
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minimize the impact and improve recovery.111  The report discusses definitions of 
resilience/resiliency, some methods for measuring resiliency, and measures that 
could be taken to enhance resiliency.   
The report further differentiates between protection and resiliency, 
“Perhaps a more useful way of making the distinction between protection and 
resilience is that protection focuses on the threat and resilience focuses on the 
consequences.”112 
11. Other Federal Reports 
The 2006 report from the Homeland Security Advisory Committee’s 
(HSAC) Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) brought the discussion of 
resilience versus protection to the forefront. The CITF argued that current critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) policy is heavily biased on protection measures, 
which are defensive in nature.  “The CITF believes that protection, in isolation, is 
a brittle strategy.”113  Instead, the CITF proposed “making resilience the overarching 
strategic objective” of CIP, and that a by-product of building resiliency would be 
actions, plans, and processes that would positively impact the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence variable of the Risk Model. 
Driving their argument is the reality that it is impossible to protect every 
potential target against every possible threat—whether natural, accidental, or 
intentional. The CITF points out that it is impossible to determine when enough 
protection is enough against an infinite set of possible impact vectors. Instead, by 
offering building resiliency into the portfolio of CIP measures, strategies can be 
implemented that can rapidly restore critical infrastructure, diminishing the impact 
                                            
111 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and Programs and Issues for Congress, by John D. Moteff. 
CRS R42683, 2012, Summary (accessed January 6, 2016) http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R42683.pdf). 
112 Ibid., 13.  
113 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council: Report of the 
Critical Infrastructure Task Force, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf, January 2006 (accessed February 10, 2016). 
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and rebounding more quickly. In the absence of resiliency, the effect from an 
unanticipated and undefended weakness could have an immediate and long-
lasting impact. It goes on to suggest that the optimal risk mitigation portfolio 
would include both protective and resiliency enhancement measures.114 
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) identified five 
basic missions for the Department of Homeland Security for the next four years 
(2014–2018) when the next Quadrennial Review is due. Of these, Mission 5 most 
directly addresses the subject studied here, that being “Strengthen National 
Preparedness and Resilience.”115  The QHSR also injected another dimension of 
Risk looking forward:  “The aging or deteriorating condition of significant aspects 
of [the United States’] critical infrastructure systems ….”116  The QHSR argues 
that the declining condition makes the CIKR more vulnerable by diminishing 
resiliency, potentially leading to adverse impacts greater than otherwise would be 
if the infrastructure were fully healthy.117  However, the QHSR sees opportunity 
in the need to rebuild our infrastructure. In rebuilding, we can make the 
infrastructure more robust, more resilient, and able to better withstand the 
threats—natural, accidental, and intentional—that could disrupt the continuity of 
service it provides. There is a cost-benefit as well. By building resiliency into the 
infrastructure revitalization, direct construction costs could be spread across the 
project, which would certainly be less than having to rebuild devastated 
infrastructure.118  QHSR speaks of “A Whole Community approach to planning 
and implementing disaster strategies,”119 whereby stakeholder partnerships and 
relationships—between public and private sector entities—identify shared 
                                            
114 DHS, HSAC: Report of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force.  
115 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial  Homeland Security Review, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf, June 14, 2014, 
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infrastructure concerns and seek common ground for improving the security and 
resiliency posture across that commonality. 
The 911 Report noted that “[o]pportunities to do harm are as great, or 
greater, in maritime or surface transportation.”120  The 911 Report, therefore, 
recommended that “[h]ard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. 
The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that 
need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most 
practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, 
and funding to implement the effort.”121  With “[n]o single security measure 
[being] foolproof,” building sufficient resiliency into CIKR to withstand disruptions, 
rather than focusing on specific threat vectors, will guarantee a return on 
investment greater than simply protecting the CIKR against a possible threat.122 
B. ACADEMIC, RESEARCH, AND WHITE PAPERS 
The remaining literature reviewed included academic papers, research, 
studies, reports, and white papers from academia, “think tanks,” governmental 
agencies, consensus organizations, and students. The content of the literature 
included analytical models, statistical analysis, critiques, and studies that could 
potentially inform the discussion on the Port Security Grant Program. 
Statistical data provided by industry organizations including the American 
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), governmental agencies such as the 
Maritime Administration (MARAD), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) 
and research performed under the contract. Academic literature sought to 
explore potential models for assessing port security, critiques of the PSGP 
efficacy, studies of and alternatives to infrastructure protection, concepts of 
resiliency, and concepts of complexity and system of systems. 
                                            
120 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2011-05-16), The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“911 
Report,” Authorized Edition) (p. 391). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition. 
121 911 Report, 391. 
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In a 2005 report for the American Enterprise Institute, Veronique de Rugy, 
cut to the chase and raised the difficult point: “Since the number of possible 
attacks is effectively unlimited and the resources we can devote to the fight 
against terror are limited, spending should not occur without a careful cost-
benefit analysis.”123  She makes an honest point. When facing limited resources 
for unlimited potential disruptive vectors (let us expand the concern beyond 
terrorism to include natural and accidental man-made disruptions), investments 
must be made that have the greatest promise of success in mitigating the highest 
probability of occurrence, weighted for severity of the impact. She emphasizes 
terrorist pose two threats to port security; (a) threat to the port, intending to 
disrupt maritime commerce, and (b) the threat through the port, by moving 
dangerous materials into the country for use in terror attacks (be they 
CBRNE/WMD, financing, small weapons). In discussing direct port threats, Ms. 
Rugy identifies the clear weakness in taking the “hardening of infrastructure” 
posture; the attacker has the inherent advantage of mobility, the ability to go 
around the hardened target and select another.124 Ms. Rugy, therefore, 
determines that there be two avenues that best mitigate the terrorist risk to 
maritime ports: the first is, given the terrorist advantage of flexibility, intelligence 
gathering is the most cost-effective means of preventing an attack; “[t]he second-
best solution is to mitigate damage after an attack.”125  She raises the concept of 
“mega port,” those extremely large, complex port systems that coincide with 
major metropolitan population centers and multimodal transportation hubs 
through which the majority of the nation’s trade flows. By definition, disruptions to 
mega ports would set off cascading impacts on a global scale with severe 
national economic damage.126  Interestingly, her conclusion is to leave direct 
protection to the local authorities and CI owner/operators and leave the 
                                            
123 Veronique de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” “What Does 
Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” AEI Economic Policy Working Paper Series (2005): 3. 
124 de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” 5. 
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prevention of attack and interdiction of smuggling to national intelligence 
gathering.127 
Natural and human-induced disasters affect organizations in  
myriad ways because of the inherent interconnectedness  
and interdependencies among human, cyber, and physical 
infrastructures, but more importantly, because organizations 
depend on the effectiveness of people and on the leadership they 
provide to the organizations they serve and represent. These 
human-organizational-cyber-physical infrastructure entities are 
termed system of systems.128  
Haimes provides insight into the understanding system of systems 
thinking and relevance for applying the theory to the maritime transportation 
system (MTS) as such. He describes concepts of “interdependent and 
interconnected subsystems, which in their totality constitute a system of 
systems.”129  He states that to model a complex system of systems, one must: 
 Determine component system properties. 
 Identify the relationships between the components and 
subsystems. 
 Quantify Intra- and interdependencies between the core 
components and subsystems. 
 Define the relational parameters and functions within the complex 
of component subsystems.130 
A practical advantage of studying the MTS regarding a complex system of 
systems is the ability to understand the concepts of coupling and emergence, 
and how they influence system disruption and resiliency.131  Haimes also speaks 
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to seeking a balanced approach to homeland security preparedness. Specifically, 
that “[b]alancing protective and resilience actions through system-level analysis 
will provide a means to improve the overall efficiency of regional and national 
preparedness.”132 
An important distinction “of the system of systems perspective is not 
prediction …, but instead is an understanding that the essence of the problem—
the hard-to-grasp insight—likely appears only from this elevated perspective.”  
Instead, the system of systems thinking seeks to understand “probability of 
possibilities, a ‘what-if’ map” in large complex, interdependent, and emergent 
systems.133  Additionally, Haimes offers “[t]he system of systems performs 
functions and carries out purposes that do not reside in any component system. 
These behaviors are emergent properties of the entire system of systems and 
not the behavior of any component system. The principle purposes supporting 
the engineering of these systems are fulfilled by these emergent behaviors.”134  
Haimes further defines emergent systems as “those system features that are not 
designed in advance, but evolve, based on sequences of collected events that 
create the motivation and responses for properties that ultimately emerge into 
system features.”135  Emergence in systems are those evolutionary adaptations 
that are products of the relationships between subsystem components of a 
complex system that result in outcomes not anticipated or designed. 
There have been criticisms of how the federal government has prosecuted 
national preparedness for all-hazards emergencies. Those criticisms are not the 
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sole province of the GAO. In the October 2008 edition of Homeland Security 
Affairs, Dr. Samuel Clovis challenges the DHS top-down model of policy creation, 
goal definition, and all-hazards preparedness, instead offering the contrapositive 
position:136  
 There is no idealized level of national preparedness universally 
possible now or into the future with current resource levels; 
 Successful fulfillment of grant fund policies is not dependent upon 
narrowly-defined, coercive and explicit direction from the federal 
government. 
 Federally mandated homeland security, all-hazards preparedness 
cannot create a universally employable model across all 
jurisdictions.137 
Since 9/11, the homeland security discussion has evolved from protecting 
critical infrastructure (CI) from terrorist attacks to making CI more resilient to all 
hazards disruptions. In this context, “resilience can be seen as having the ability 
to resist, absorb, recover from or adapt to adverse changes.”138  Kimmance 
makes the argument that, building resilience into an infrastructure system would 
dramatically improve sustainability and survivability.  “A resilient infrastructure 
may be considered as one in which the physical systems and assets have a 
degree of robustness and are therefore capable of surviving and performing well 
under conditions of change while avoiding excessively conservative design.”139  
Kimmance provides another description of what is meant by interdependency; 
“… infrastructure systems … are individually complex and comprise a collection 
of internally interacting components, as well as external linkages to other 
systems … [that] can bring synergies improving efficiency and service levels with 
associated economic and societal benefits.”140  It is important to emphasize that 
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unlike hardening and protection, which is defensive in posture and focuses on a 
specific, anticipated threat vector, resiliency seeks to make the infrastructure 
more robust and able to withstand unspecified threats by addressing 
uncertainty.141 
Resilience in emergent systems is influenced by the coupling of the 
component subsystems of the system of systems. Redundancy and robustness 
are elements that help determine the resiliency of a system. Redundancy refers 
to the ability of other subsystem components to assume the lost or diminished 
capability and capacity of a damaged subsystem component. Robustness refers 
to the ability of a subsystem component to absorb impact, or of the system of the 
systems to withstand disruption.142 
In ““A Systems Approach to Governance in Maritime Transportation 
System of Systems (MTSoS)” by Mo Mansouri et al. of Stevens Institute of 
Technology, they put forward the proposition that “[s]ince disruption as a result of 
uncertainty is inevitable, such systems need to be designed and operated in such 
a manner that they can adopt appropriate strategies such as flexibility, resilience, 
and agility in the face of disturbances.”143  Mansouri discusses the independence 
and interdependency of MTSoS constituent components as independent of one 
another, but at certain subsystem level are interdependent upon one another, 
making connections both hierarchically as well as horizontally, forming the 
complexity of the MTSoS.144  Prime among the MTSoS constituents, according 
to Mansouri, are ships, ports, intermodal interfaces, the waterways, and users.145  
The elements of the MTSoS are influenced by laws, regulations, and policies; 
                                            
141 Ibid. 
142 Haimes, “Homeland Security Preparedness: Balancing Protection with Resilience in 
Emergent Systems,” 291. 
143 Mo Mansouri, Alex Gorod, Thomas H. Wakeman, and Brian Sauser, “A Systems 
Approach to Governance in Maritime Transportation System of Systems,” School of Systems and 
Enterprises, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, 2009: 2. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 3. 
 63
financial pressures; human and environmental factors—all who shape the 
response of the constituent elements and influence the emergence of the 
MTSoS.146 
C. OTHER SOURCES 
1. Stakeholders Survey 
Port Security Grant stakeholders were recruited to participate in a short 
survey in addition to the review of literature and doctrine. The pool of potential 
respondents were members of two Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC); 
one from an historically Tier I port, and the other from a Tier II port. Public and 
private sector MTS stakeholders comprise the AMSC membership. Their 
participation was crucial to understanding the PSGP from the stakeholders’ 
points of view—the applicants, facilitators, and administrators. Their contributions 
provided insight into what the administrators believed was the purpose of the 
PSGP and how well it was meeting that purpose, and compared to the 
impression and experiences of the applicants and field-level stakeholders.  
Potential survey respondents were recruited through their Coast Guard 
Sector Port Security Specialist by email. A consent form was provided, that 
explained details of the study and request to participate in the survey. AMSC 
members wishing to participate emailed signed forms back to the researcher, 
and in return were provided with a unique, randomly generated five-digit 
identification code and the survey in Excel format. The only identifier on the 
survey is the unique code. Only the researcher has the key to the code, kept on 
encrypted media, to preserve respondent anonymity. 
The survey consisted of twenty questions. The first five were demographic 
in nature. The remaining was specific to the respondent’s experience with the 
PSGP. The respondent was asked either to select a multiple choice answer, 
select “Yes” or “No,” or identify their strength of agreement with a statement on a 
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7-point Likert Scale with 1 being Strongly Disagree to 7 being Strongly Agree. 
The survey questions are below, with the type of solution to the question in RED 
to the right. Figures 15 through 17 are screen captures of the survey. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Survey Page 1. 
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Figure 16.  Survey Page 2. 
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Figure 17.  Survey Page 3. 
2. Stakeholder Interviews 
Finally, a selection of subject matter experts was interviewed to provide 
depth to the survey results. Some interviewees were members of the survey 
respondent cadre while others were program managers at FEMA GPD and U.S. 
Coast Guard Port Security Specialists and Coast Guard Headquarters program 
managers for MS-RAM and the Port Security Grant Program.   
While the literature and survey results helped initiate the discussion, the 
direction of the conversations largely was left to the interviewees discretion with 
the only caveat to staying on the topic of the Port Security Grant Program. The 
interviews provided actual, first-person experience with the PSGP and well-





A. FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the shock of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United 
States federal government responded energetically. Beyond the horror of the 
human toll, the vulnerability and the vital need to protect our critical infrastructure 
and key resources was immediately recognized in the aftermath. That recognition 
included the profound understanding of how essential the nation’s MTS is to our 
economic vitality, and how exposed the United States is to attacks to and through 
that vector. The directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategies, and plans that 
cascaded from the initiative to shore up our vulnerable MTS are well designed to 
support one another throughout the doctrine hierarchy. Each level of policies, 
plans and strategies support fulfillment of a strategic goal from the most macro 
level National Maritime Security Plan, through the Area Maritime Security Plans, 
down to the individual Vessel Security Plans and Facility Security Plans. The full 
suite of maritime security doctrine provides a clear and identifiable set of goals 
for targeting Port Security Grant Program funding application proposals; 
proposals that in turn complete the maritime security continuum from the national 
level to port level and individual stakeholders. The NIPP provides the foundation 
for developing CIKR protection strategies and making the CIKR more resilient 
when disruptions occur. 
The PSGP has evolved over almost a decade and a half, shifting 
administrators to reside ultimately within FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate 
(GPD). Each year a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) is published by 
FEMA GPD that announces the PSGP’s guidelines. The guidelines are ever 
evolving from one fiscal year to the next, however all proposals are required to 
adhere to the National Preparedness System and Goal.   
These changes in protection strategy reflect the evolving understanding 
that the impact from disruption to critical infrastructure is the same regardless of 
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the cause. That is the point of having “lessons learned”—to learn from them, 
adapt, and improve in time for the next challenge against the system. 
The GAO repeatedly calls out the need for FEMA to curb potential areas 
of waste, recommends consolidation of all Homeland Security Grant Programs 
into a single grant, and establish a means to measure how successful any given 
PSGP grantee proposal has been towards meeting its stated goal and improving 
port security. These include the lack of a mechanism for revising a port’s risk 
profile to account for risk mitigated through implementation of prior grant 
proposals; concerns about inefficiencies and potential waste when grant 
applicants compete for multiple, comparable grants, e.g., PSGP and Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) grants. Also, the GAO cites the lack of progress in 
establishing Interagency Operations Centers (IOC)147 mandated by the SAFE 
Port Act.148  Lastly is the frequent inability of FEMA to disburse grant funds due 
to the failure of grantees to meet requisite project milestones.149 
The 911 Report was focused primarily on the external, existential threat 
from terrorists and their stated desire to target disruption of our economic 
system. By publication of the 2014 QSHR the United States had experienced 
some natural and man-made disasters:  Hurricanes KATRINA, RITA, and 
SANDY, as well as the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig disaster. The evolution from 
terrorist-centric to all-hazards focused planning heralds the maturation of the 
homeland security field of play. The National Response Plan evolved into the 
National Response Framework, with a suite of Frameworks underpinning the 
complete planning and response life cycle. As such, the 2014 QSHR strongly 
emphasized the dual importance of protection AND resiliency as necessary 
ingredients for shoring the nation’s critical infrastructure from disruptive and 
perhaps debilitating impact from all hazards. 
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From the CRS come important concepts to consider in assessing port risk 
and building risk management strategies: 
 Risk inheritance—risk assumed from proximity to another at-risk 
entity.   
 Risk management—a continual process of risk identification and 
monitoring to inform decisions for risk acceptance and 
avoidance.150 
 Asset protection is a brittle strategy; resiliency strategies would 
minimize the impact and improve recovery.151  
  
 “Perhaps a more useful way of making the distinction between 
protection and resilience is that protection focuses on the threat 
and resilience focuses on the consequences.”152 
 
I concur with the recommendation to incorporate both concepts in any 
assessment for Port Security Grant proposals. 
The CRS also highlighted a key concern of then Secretary Chertoff; that 
“federal homeland security assistance should not remain a program for general 
revenue sharing.”153 Financial dependency is always a concern with grant 
programs. State, local and tribal jurisdictions often look to grants as budget 
supplements—they may even plan their operational budgets with the expectation 
of being awarded grant funds. The CRS suggested that larger, more complex 
projects could benefit from building synergies between multiple grants, the GAO 
sighted the lack of visibility of inter-grant applications and project dependencies 
on multiple grants as problematic. There is a fine line between gaining synergies 
by stacking multiple grants to fulfill larger, complex projects, and the risk of 
project failure if the grantee failed to compete for a dependent grant. Additionally, 
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without sufficient oversight of the entirety of grants applied for, there is a risk for 
waste and mismanagement.154   
The CRS’ key concept is that it is time for critical infrastructure protection 
to shift from simply protecting CI to ensuring that CI is more resilient and better 
able to recover quickly from disruptive events.155   
While doctrine has been updated to include “resiliency” as a CI risk 
management strategy, the initiative has not translated sufficiently into the PSGP 
guidance. Resiliency remains a vague concept, and in practice, while the PSGP 
continues to focus on awarding individual grant proposals, the resiliency of the 
MTS as a system of systems cannot be realized.  
The Homeland Security Advisory Committee’s (HSAC) Critical 
Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) amplified the CRS’ call to not only embrace 
resiliency as a critical component of CI risk management strategies but elevate 
systemic resiliency as a priority over protection. The logic is that “The CITF 
believes that protection, in isolation, is a brittle strategy.”156 That assessment 
hinges on the determination that current critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
emphasizes protection measures, such as hardening individual entities, which is 
defensive in nature and fails to address continuity of operations during and after 
an incident.157 
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) identified five 
basic missions for the Department of Homeland Security for the next four years 
(2014–2018). Mission 5, “Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience”158 
elevates resiliency building as a national preparedness priority. The QHSR adds 
the “deteriorating condition” of our CI as contributing to the vulnerability of our CI 
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to disruptive impacts159  due to the inherently reduced resiliency and potentially 
greater impact from disruption than would be otherwise. The QHSR then offers a 
silver lining; investing in CI rehabilitation now could incorporate improvements to 
resiliency at less cost than if investing in resiliency enhancements retroactively 
and alone.160  The QHSR also addresses a “Whole Community approach to 
planning and implementing disaster strategies;”161 a perspective that would 
welcome consortiums of port stakeholders to work together to enhance port 
security and resiliency. 
The 911 Report’s highlighting of the significant damage to the nation that 
could be realized through the MTS vector, either directly against the MTS or 
taking advantage of the MTS to further infiltrate the country and do harm 
elsewhere, is significant.162  The maturation of homeland security strategy since 
then has evolved from the defensive protection posture to the denial or limitation 
of success posture of building resiliency into the CI. The “hard choices” the 911 
Report referred to in determining how best to invest limited resources is in part 
mitigated by building in resiliency. Resiliency, by definition, buys down risk.163  
After all, “[n]o single security measure is foolproof.”164   
B. FINDINGS FROM SURVEYS 
The participation rate was disappointingly low and insufficient to make 
statistically supportable inferences. However, given the fairly even distribution of 
representatives from the various stakeholder communities, some patterns 
emerged, supported by the follow-up and more detailed interviews, to sufficiently 
develop broad and useful conclusions.   
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From the survey results, the respondents clearly ascribe value to the 
PSGP, regardless of their role or association within the MTS—public or private 
sector affiliation. While there is agreement that the PSGP guidelines correlate 
with the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the PSGP linkage with the MS-
RAM analyzes and AMSC Port Security Risk Assessments is spurious at best, 
with respondents reporting “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” on the related 
questions asserting close linkages.   
Universally, no respondents believed that it would be better to roll the 
PSGP into a single homeland security grant. Similarly, it was also unanimously 
felt that port consortiums should be allowed to compete for PSGP funds. There 
was strong, positive agreement that the PSGP could be improved if PSGP 
funding focused on holistic port-wide security improvements rather than through 
a patchwork of individual port entities competing against one another for funding. 
Respondents were not enthusiastic about either of the alternative funding 
proposals of tax deductions or other fiscal offsets to encourage the private sector 
to self-invest in enhancing their private infrastructure security, protection, and 
resiliency. 
One interesting result was that all but one respondent either disagreed or 
had a neutral stance on the suggestion that flexible performance periods should 
replace rigid one, two, or three-year periods. The expectation was that greater 
flexibility in meeting project milestones would be desirable. 
Both AMSCs had developed Port-wide Risk Mitigation Plans (PRMP) and 
Business Continuity/Resumption of Trade Plans (BCRTP) and periodically review 
and update them. Of the two, only the smaller, Tier 2 port AMSC actively 
collaborate with other regional security groups outside the AMSC, such as with 
UASI-only or Transit Security Working Groups. All but one respondent thought 
that both protection and resiliency should be the focus of PSGP projects; that 
one outlier felt only protection should be the focus.  
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The statement about “The disallowance of consortiums to compete for the 
PSGP has had a positive impact on improving port security” were all either 
neutral or in disagreement with that statement. However, there was a dual mode 
result, with one modal peak at the one extreme of “Strongly Disagree” and the 
other at the opposite end of the respondent spectrum of “Neither Agree nor 
Disagree.”  Looking deeper at the data, the respondents that Strongly Disagreed 
are from a Tier I port encompassing three States, a Top 5 metropolitan city, a 
Top 10 port system, and two Federal Regions. Despite those challenges, or 
because of them, there was a strong belief that consortiums were valuable to 
improving port security through the PSGP. It is also noteworthy that the 
respondents in this group represented Federal, State agency, and private sector 
respondents. The second modal peak for the Tier II port respondents 
represented the same stakeholder grouping: Federal, State, and Private Sector. 
However, the Tier II port is small, homogeneous, and wholly within the 
boundaries of a single state and single Federal Region.  
The following graphs in Figures 18 through 21 show the distribution of 











































Figure 21.  Survey Results. 
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Table 3.   All Survey Responses. 
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C. FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
1. The Coast Guard MS-RAM Program165 
The Coast Guard’s MS-RAM database continues to be relied upon to help 
inform PSGP proposal review. MS-RAM uses various attack scenarios to test 
critical infrastructure vulnerability to the specific threat vectors presented in the 
scenario. Based on the outcome of the scenario analysis, risk scores are 
determined. The Coast Guard provides these risk scores to FEMA for calculating 
an applicant’s relative risk and the suitability of a PSGP proposal. 
Time and again, the GAO recognizes the Coast Guard’s progress on 
improving the MS-RAM, while noting that MS-RAM is not capable of calculating 
port-wide risk reduction or return on investment towards that end for executed 
PSGP proposals. MS-RAM is a hypothetical analytic tool; it cannot predict the 
probability of any particular attack mode, or even if it will be one of the modes 
pre-defined in the program, nor can it predict the degree of impact. All that it can 
provide is the potential success and an estimation of the degree of impact that a 
facility could realize if presented with a particular scenario. 
2. PSGP Broadly166 
The PSGP is a valuable resource for aiding ports in addressing port 
security concerns. The port security program under MTSA has matured over the 
past decade and a half incorporating lessons learned and establishing Area 
Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) and Port-Wide Risk Mitigation Plans 
(PRMP) as organizations and roadmaps, respectively, for achieving port security 
improvement. However, recurring challenges continue to daunt the PSGP. The 
following citations from a Coast Guard District’s feedback are representative of 
recurring themes nationally: 
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 “The Port Security Grant program (PSGP) continues to demand an 
ever-increasing amount of time, attention, and oversight, placing an 
additional workload on the COTP and their staff for this unfunded 
mandate. Furthermore, the compressed and unrealistic timelines 
associated with the PSGP places considerable stress on the COTP 
and AMSC to schedule, facilitate, and complete the field review 
phase. Finally, the Coast Guard has become the face of the PSGP 
and applicants continue to direct application, award, and post-
award questions to the COTP and their staff [rather than to FEMA 
GPD].”167 
 “Cyber related vulnerabilities are a growing portion of the total risk 
exposure facing the Marine Transportation System (MTS), and it 
continues to be a challenge for COTPs, AMSCs, and maritime 
stakeholders. Aside from the requirement to report a cyber-attack 
(or potential attack) or breach of security that could lead to a 
Transportation Security Incident (TSI), there is no regulatory 
jurisdiction to require cyber security measures. Additionally, other 
than raising awareness through the AMSCs or creating cyber 
security related subcommittees, COTPs and their staffs have 
limited knowledge and training to support cyber security 
preparedness within their port areas.”168 
 And as the program has aged, “COTPs have noted decreasing 
AMSC membership throughout the District. Part of this is due to 
reduce operating budgets at other agencies and organizations, 
especially in COTP zones with expansive AORs. “169 
Additionally, PSGP applicants consistently complained that they never 
receive feedback on why proposals fail to win grant funding. This simple act 
could significantly improve successful funding proposals. The vagaries of grant 
awards still swing dependent upon the quality of the grant writer as much as the 
worthiness of the proposal. 
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3. PSGP Specifically,170 
There is universal frustration from both the public and private sector port 
stakeholders outside Washington, D.C., with the perception that the national 
program managers dismiss the resident knowledge, experience, and expertise of 
the local AMSC stakeholders. AMSC members invest a great deal of time and 
effort to provide accurate and substantive input to the port assessments and the 
investment justifications for individual proposals. By the time they come under 
review at the national level, the input appears to be dismissed, with the final 
result seeming arbitrary. 
At the most fundamental level, this is a case of poor communications and 
marketing by the national program managers. While local stakeholders 
acknowledged that they are not in a position to prioritize proposals and 
assessments across a national spectrum, they are confident in their knowledge 
of the regional MTS and their ability to assess the port’s vulnerability. The 
absence of transparency in national level port evaluations undermines local 
stakeholders’ confidence in the PSGP process. 
It is demotivating when an AMSC’s priority listing of risks, vulnerabilities, 
and criticality is apparently ignored and overridden by the national program 
without consultation or explanation with the AMSC. The general impression is 
that no one has a better understanding of the local concerns than the local 
stakeholders. The AMSC port stakeholders expressed frustration with revisions 
of port assessments and the vetting of proposals in an apparent vacuum or 
without local consultation that results in a sense of disenfranchisement. 
It must be clear that this is not an indictment of the FEMA GDP or even its 
predecessor PSGP administrators. It may, in fact, be an artifact of the apparent 
disconnect between the PSGP Guidelines—focusing on individual entities rather 
than the MTS as a system—and overarching national level policies which identify 
                                            
170 Respondent 81950, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016; 
Respondent 36758, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016; Respondent 
16258, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016. 
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the MTS as a system of systems requiring a systems approach to improving port 
security and resiliency. It may also be a function of FEMA’s experience with 
grants administration; FEMA grants have historically addressed mitigating risk or 
damages to individuals and individual entities (even if the entities are a 
jurisdiction). That type of administrative philosophy predisposes responding to 
individual needs. What is needed is a philosophical shift to align program 
administration with national level policy and better process transparency and 
dialectic with the port stakeholders.  
A consensus from respondents felt that the use of a fiduciary agent (FA) 
and submission of proposals by consortia should at the very least be an option. 
The forced “one size fits all” format in the latest iterations of the PSGP Notice of 
Financial Opportunities (NOFO) in some cases precludes taking advantage of 
the best possible option for improving the security and resiliency posture of a port 
by only accepting single-entity-only proposals. The FA, in the case of consortia 
and port-wide proposals, has in many cases served their port community well as 
an “honest broker” and “project manager.” The FA has ensured that investment 
justifications (IJ) are well designed and actionable. The FA then maintains an 
oversight role ensuring that metrics and milestones are met. The allowance for 
consortia seems to be an obvious positive option. If we accept that the port is a 
system, in fact, a system-of-systems, then disallowing consortia runs contrary to 
that assessment. Consortia, by definition, are a collection of entities—a system. 
While respondents believed that plan proposals from consortia should be 
allowed to compete, they also recognized the equal value in individual entities’ 
competing for grant funding. There are instances where either option poses an 
opportunity to improve port security and resiliency.   
However, FEMA is also constrained by the construct of the grant design, 
which would have to be modified to allow for the greater flexibility necessary to 
address many of these recommendations. FEMA’s GDP staff of professionals 
have vast grant management and analytical experience. While consortia and 
fiduciary agents have been found to be beneficial options for some stakeholders, 
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individual direct funding has been so for other stakeholders and proposals. GDP 
also points out that the use of FA’s comes at a cost, too.  
First, a direct cost. FAs are compensated for their program oversight by 
attaching a surcharge to the grant disbursement; typically, 3% to 5% of the gross 
grant amount funded. The second is an indirect cost but has the potential to 
exacerbate the criticism about transparency and communications between 
stakeholders and program managers. With a fiduciary agent, FEMA GDP cannot 
communicate with the stakeholders directly, but must work through the fiduciary 
agent. It is up to the fiduciary agent to continue the communications down to the 
stakeholders. The prohibition on FEMA GDP’s responding directly with grantees 
may have led to some of the stakeholder comments voicing frustration with an 
apparent lack of transparency and communications when in fact they should 
have addressed their questions through the FA. Direct communications between 
FEMA GPD and grantees is systemically obstructed when an FA is used. Either 
grant applicants will have to accept the trade-off or the precepts for administering 
the PSGP will have to be changed. However, the implications of using and FA 
and the moratorium on direct communications between FEMA GDP and grant 
applicants should be more clearly communicated. 
According to FEMA GDP, there is not a ban on consortia. To clarify, 
FEMA GDP is constrained by only being able to award a grant to a single entity 
for accountability, but within a port groups can organize into de fact consortia to 
submit a joint proposal. The caveat is that the proposal must be submitted by a 
single entity who will be (a) accountable for the execution of the proposal, and (b) 
be the single point of contact for FEMA as the grantee of record. For cost-share 
obligations, the grant applicant would be responsible for proving availability of 
matching funds, but any distributed cost-share between the consortia partners 
would have to be negotiated in a separate agreement between the parties to the 
consortia. The grant awardee would act as a de facto fiduciary agent for the 
partners in the consortia. Recognition of the consortia is external to the PSGP 
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and FEMA GDP. From the program manager’s point of view, the grant is 
awarded to a single entity. 
The 2015 PSGP NOFO leveled the cost match to 25% for both public and 
private sector applicants. Investment in security and resiliency enhancements is 
an expense. In the absence of a disruption, it is essentially equivalent to 
insurance. Insurance from a business perspective is an expense. The higher the 
match requirement, the less inclined a stakeholder is in participating in the PSGP 
competition, with the resulting missed opportunity to address a vulnerability. 
When asked if a tax benefit would encourage independent investment in the 
absence of winning a grant, the general response was that the savings in tax 
benefits are insignificant and less likely to encourage independent investment. 
Another frequent complaint is that grants appear to be awarded to those 
that write the best grant proposal, drafted as proposals that are sure to include all 
the essential keywords in the NOFO. But, a proposal that captures all the NOFO 
keywords does not equate to the highest priority proposal for a region. This 
observation links back to the prior frustration with the apparent discounting of the 
AMSC’s and Captain of the Ports’ prioritization of proposals for their region. 
The NOFO suggests that proposals be linked to the existing Port-wide 
Risk Management Plan although the PRMP is no longer required and 
maintenance of the previously constructed plan is only a recommendation. Two 
issues come to light. The first is, the PRMP by design identifies a plan for 
improving port-wide security and resiliency. It provides a plan, with gaps 
analyzed, and a roadmap to closing those gaps. The PRMP provides a real 
metric for assessing the degree of risk reduction. A port-wide proposal should not 
just be allowed, but encouraged to address systemic risk. 
The PSGP eliminated the port tier or port group system. All ports now 
compete in the same pool of PSGP funds so that there is no longer any 
specifically set-aside funding for different scale ports. The concern is that if DHS 
determines final prioritization of grant awards, the smaller ports will lose to the 
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mega-ports; that will leave untended backdoor opportunities for terrorist to take 
advantage. It is important to remember that 9–11 terrorist pilot Muhammed Atta’s 
crew came through the small local Portland, ME airport on their way to Boston’s 
Logan International Airport to avoid attention.171  The smaller ports, remote from 
major metropolitan areas provide similar cover. The impression of the 
respondents was that the former port tier or group system ensured that some 
PSGP funding was distributed throughout the United States’ MTS networks at all 
levels, and not just to the high visibility mega-ports. 
One final observation regards port cyber-security, which is rapidly 
becoming a great national level concern. To date, national outreach efforts with 
the private sector have not been effective. Attendees at a recent port cyber-
security events have been largely from various levels of government, academia, 
and think tanks; not the private sector (Recall that the majority of the MTS 
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector). Engagement has to 
be inclusive of all port stakeholders. Outreach will be critical. For proprietary 
reasons, the maritime industry is reticent to sharing information, as even 
providing the port destination for certain cargoes can significantly impact market 
values. The concern to protect proprietary commercial information is particularly 
true for those commodities sold on the spot market. Gaining stakeholder trust will 
be dependent upon convincing the private sector that proprietary information will 
be well protected. 
Under the NIPP, many of the CI Sectors have ISACs—Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers. There is a Maritime ISAC—the Maritime Security 
Council. The Maritime ISAC’s “mission is to advance the security of the United 
States and the international maritime community by representing maritime 
interests before government bodies; acting as liaison between industry and 
government; disseminating timely information; encouraging and assisting in the 
development of industry-specific technologies; and convening educational and 
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informational conferences for our membership and government partners.”172  
While reference to the Maritime ISAC is absent in the PSGP, the ISAC could be 
leveraged to address much of the communication challenges MTS made by port 
stakeholders. 
D. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES—FAILURE FROM LACK OF 
RESILIENCY 
Two recent products from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of Cyber and 
Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) provide very clear illustrations of the need for 
elevating resiliency as an essential factor in managing risk to the MTS. The first 
report is a scenario-based analysis of the expected impacts of an extended and 
unanticipated closure of the Poe Lock, the major lock within the Soo Locks 
joining Lake Superior to Lake Huron via the St. Mary’s River past the twin cities 
of Sault Ste. Marie, MI, USA and Sault Ste. Marie, ON, Canada. The second 
report is an analysis of the potential consequences of a cyber-attack on the MTS.  
1. OCIA Analysis of Poe Lock Disruption  
The DHS made public the OCIA’s October 2015 report on “The Perils of 
Efficiency: An Analysis of an Unexpected Closure of the Poe Lock and its 
Impact.”  While the vast majority of ports are a tangled web of interdependent 
multi-sector nodes, the Great Lakes steel industry is very homogeneous and, 
therefore, provides a very succinct example of the consequences of 
interdependency. 
The Soo Locks are a series of locks built, maintained, and operated by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Currently, only two locks are operating within the 
Soo Locks:  The Poe Lock and the MacArthur Lock. Of the two, only the Poe 
Lock is capable of locking through the dominate Great Lakes Thousand 
Footers—Great Lakes ships purpose-built to operate on the Great Lakes 
                                            
172 The Maritime Security Council, http://www.maritimesecurity.org/, 2015 (accessed March 
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transporting bulk product, largely taconite ore and coal, for the steel industry. The 
U.S. fleet never leaves the Great Lakes. The MacArthur Lock is unable to 
accommodate the Thousand Footers, and can only lock through substantially 
smaller vessels. The two other locks in the U.S. portion of the system are 
currently decommissioned—the Davis and Sabin Locks—unserviceable and too 
shallow to lock through the existing fleet of Lakers. The one lock on the Canadian 
side is only capable of serving recreational boating traffic.173  Figure 22 is a 




Figure 22.  Screenshot from Google Earth accessed 06 March 2016. 
The OCIA based the scenario on a hypothetical unscheduled six-month 
closure of the Poe Lock during the primary shipping season, from March 25th to 
                                            
173 Personal knowledge as Coast Guard Ninth District Prevention Division Chief responsible 
for the Coast Guard’s Waterways Management mission in the U.S. Great Lakes system. 
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September 25th.,174 The study focused on impacts to the supply chains serviced 
by vessels transiting the Soo Locks. 
The economic impact from the cascading effects of the unscheduled 
closure of the Poe Lock for the six prime shipping months would have a 
devastating effect across sectors of the economy, and internationally to a major 
extent in Canada and Mexico.175  The report is extensive and highly detailed, 
summarized significantly herein for illustrative purposes. 
Iron ore is mined primarily in the western Lake Superior basin of 
Minnesota and North Dakota.176  The ports of Duluth, Two Harbors, and Silver 
Bay in Minnesota and Superior, Wisconsin are the four loading ports for 
taconite.177 The destination ports are all in Lake Michigan and Lake Erie, through 
the Soo Locks.     
The scenario generated closure of 74 percent of the U.S. steel production; 
in particular, those mills that the appliances, automobile, construction, farming, 
mining equipment, and rail car manufacturing industries are substantially 
dependent.178  The automotive industry would eventually have to shutter, as it 
would be impossible to source the specific grades of production steels cost 
effectively from non-U.S. mills. According to the Analysis, over 50 distinct 
                                            
174 Navigation on the Great Lakes is seasonal, between freezing over of the Lakes (a 
moving target itself) and the closure of the Soo Locks and the Welland Lock (that by-passes 
Niagara Falls allowing “salties,” or ocean-going vessels, to transit to and from the Great Lakes 
and the ocean.) After the locks close (the “closed season”), domestic U.S. and Canadian shipping 
continues until ice conditions become prohibitive; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, The 
Perils of Efficiency: An analysis of an Unexpected Closure of the Poe Lock and its Impact, 
(Washington, DC: Homeland Security Information Network, 2015), 19. 
175 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 25. 
176 There is one mine in the northern part of Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, which ships ore by 
trains to the ports of Marquette on Lake Superior, and Escanaba on Lake Michigan in Green Bay 
which is converted into taconite pellets for transport. Escanaba is the only shipping port for 
taconite not in Lake Superior. (OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 20). 
177 It is noteworthy that there are many grades of taconite pellets and they are not 
interchangeable, but are specific to a particular type of steel being produced from them. (OCIA, 
pp. 2–3).  
178 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 20. 
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industries identified by unique North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) codes would be severely impacted with service impacts of 20 to 100 
percent.179   
The six-month closure of the Poe Lock translates in economic terms to a 
10-month shutdown of the automobile industry—production and sales, along with 
all of the just-in-time suppliers either without a customer to sell to, or themselves 
knocked out of production. The national economy would realize losses of $1.1 
trillion in GDP—a 6 percent decrease180—and over 10 million jobs.181  The 
unemployment rate is estimated to jump an additional 5.8 percent; more than 
doubling the current rate that is hovering around 5 percent,182 with the model 
projecting “10.9 million people out of work in the United States, with additional 
losses in Canada and Mexico.”183  
The OCIA study provides the following contextual contribution of a single 
Laker184 trip: 
 A Thousand Footer185 carries approximately 70,000 short tons of 
taconite. 
 The cargo value (in current dollars U.S.) is approximately $4 
million. 
 The four-year average of iron ore shipped through the Poe Lock is 
46.2 million tons annually. 
 Each ton of ore generates $23,000 of economic value. 
 
                                            
179 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, Appdx. E. 
180 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 34. 
181 Ibid., 20. 
182 Ibid., 30. 
183 Ibid., 32. 
184 A purpose-built commercial ship that only works upon the Great Lakes. 
185 A large Great Lakes carrier, generally around 1000’ in length. Capable of transiting only 
through the Poe Lock. 
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 Each Laker shipment represents $1.7 billion in U.S. economic 
business, and an estimated contribution of $340 million to the 
Canadian and Mexican economies.186 
The industries that rely upon the steel made from Great Lakes iron ore 
(taconite) have realized a great economic benefit from the efficiencies gained by 
transporting taconite from the ore fields via Great Lakes carriers, through the Soo 
Locks. The entirety of their profitability is dependent upon the reliable, timely, and 
cost-effective delivery of taconite by Laker. The industry built around the Great 
Lakes MTS. In fact, the mills are laid out only to receive ore from the waterside, 
with rail and over-road service, if any, for outbound product shipment. Neither the 
railroads nor over road trucking can replace the Lakers service.187 
Even if the facilities were designed to be able to accept ore from rail or 
truck, neither would be capable of meeting the demand—alone or in conjunction. 
Furthermore, if the capability existed, they are cost prohibitive options. Ancillary 
to the economic impossibilities is the fact that, by wide margins, neither rail 
shipment nor trucking is as safe or ecologically-friendly as the Lakers.188  The 
infrastructure to supplant the Lakers by rail or road does not exist. But, if it did, it 
would take approximately 2000 railcars added to an already congested 
Midwestern rail system.189 
Moving taconite by truck is more dramatic.  “Each One Thousand Footer 
Lake Carrier carries approximately 70,000 tons of iron ore, which is equivalent to 
about 3,000 trucks. The mills use the 70,000 tons about every five days, which 
means that 600 trucks per day—1 truck every 2.4 minutes—would have to enter 
a steel mill, drop its load and leave. To bring trucks to 7 mills would mean that, 
for every point on the Interstate Highway System between Minnesota and 
Indiana, there would be a truck loaded with iron ore passing every 20 seconds on 
                                            
186 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 34. 
187 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 41–45. 
188 Ibid., 41–45. 
189 Ibid., 43. 
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one side of the road and one truck returning empty on the other side of the road. 
The Interstate Highway System would have to be shut down to all traffic except 
for the iron ore trucks and no road maintenance could occur.”190 
Notably, the Poe Lock is a single point of failure potential of monumental 
proportions. The report goes on to cite potential mitigation options and then 
proves them untenable. The best option for mitigating the dependency on the 
Poe Lock is to build a second Poe Lock. The problem there is that it would be 
next to the existing Poe Lock. Assuming the loss of the lock is due to attack or 
massive scale natural or man-made disaster, then whatever impacts the current 
lock would undoubtedly do so to the other. An additional Poe Lock adds 
resiliency by way of redundancy, and only as protection against certain 
scenarios.191 
The complexity of the MTS in most ports is greater than the Poe Lock 
scenario. However, in that networked system of systems, virtually all of which 
grew as an emergent system that evolved over time, is an opportunity for building 
resiliencies. There may very well already be prospects to cultivate resiliency 
within the natural ecosystem of the port MTS system of systems that are not 
currently recognized. 
2. OCIA Analysis: Consequences to Seaport Operations from 
Malicious Cyber Activity  
On March 3, 2016, the DHS/NPPD/OCIA issued a paper entitled 
“Consequences to Seaport Operations from Malicious Cyber Activity.”  The report 
focuses on the cyber vulnerabilities presented by the dependency on information 
systems to efficiently manage the complex MTS. As a system of systems, the 
                                            
190 OCIA, The Perils of Efficiency, 45. 
191 Ibid., 52. (An important point is that, if a second Poe Lock were to be built, it would have 
to be the exact same dimensions as the current Poe Lock. If a larger capacity lock were built, 
larger ships would be built to take advantage of the economies of scale, returning us back to the 
same single point of failure scenario we face now.) 
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MTS is reliant upon other sectors as other sectors are dependent upon the 
MTS.192  Examples of sectors interdependent with the MTS are: 
 
The MTS is dependent upon the following Sectors— 
 Energy  Water & Wastewater  Emergency Services 
 Communications  Financial Services  Government Facilities 
 Transportation  Information Technology  
 
The Sectors Most Dependent upon the MTS are the following— 
 Energy  Food and Agriculture  Transportation 
 Critical Manufacturing  Chemical  Commercial Facilities 
 Transportation  Defense Industrial Base193  
 
The report cites the tremendous reliance of all aspects of the MTS on 
information technology to function. That dependency breeds susceptibility to 
many modes of failure, from specific targeted attacks to human error to 
technology obsolescence and inability to interface with other systems. 
Information technology helps navigate ships; track cargo; manage cargo 
handling, shipping, and warehousing operations; control access and security; 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems; and transaction handling—and this is a far from an all-
inclusive list.194  Couple IT systems with cellular service, GPS-enabled/ 
                                            
192 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, 
Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, Consequences to Seaport Operations from Malicious 
Cyber Activity, (Washington, DC, Homeland Security Information Network, 2016), 1–2. 
193 Not cited in OCIA, Consequences to Seaport Operations. 
194 OCIA, Consequences to Seaport Operations, 3–16. 
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dependent services, Wi-Fi wireless networking, telemetric systems, web-based 
programs, and there suddenly are many gateway opportunities to exploit.   
A vivid example of how vulnerable GPS is to spoofing—GPS spoofing is 
the use of a signal that is stronger than and mimics the attributes of a 
genuine GPS signal to take over a GPS receiver. The ability to send a signal that 
could cause the vessel’s GPS receiver to report a position chosen by the attacker 
that is somewhere other than where the receiver actually is195 was demonstrated 
by University of Texas at Austin students off the coast of Italy.  
 
Figure 23.  Screenshot from University of Texas at Austin, Cockrell School of 
Engineering, UT Austin Researchers Spoof Superyacht at Sea, Monday, Jul 29, 
2013, http://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/30/spoofing-a-superyacht-at-sea.  
The UT students successfully spoofed the GPS signal being received by 
the 213’ super yacht M/V WHITE ROSE, replacing the legitimate GPS signal with 
a false one generated by their custom-made device, with the vessel’s crew 
completely oblivious to the attack. 
                                            
195 The IT Law Wiki at http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/GPS_spoofing accessed March 8, 2016. 
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The previous year the same University of Texas team successfully 
hijacked an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) by intercepting its GPS signal and 
replacing it with a spoofed signal, taking over control of the UAV. The UT team, 
of course, are “white hats,” attempting to raise awareness of the vulnerability 
posed by GPS dependency. They argue “[w]ith 90 percent of the world’s freight 
moving across the seas and a great deal of the world’s human transportation 
going across the skies, we have to gain a better understanding of the broader 
implications of GPS spoofing,” Professor Humphreys said. “I didn’t know, until we 
performed this experiment, just how possible it is to spoof a marine vessel and 
how difficult it is to detect this attack.”196 
Unquestionably, cyber-security is a critical aspect of the MTS 
infrastructure that must be protected and made more resilient. The span of cyber-
security concerns reaches beyond any single entity within the MTS; it is the 
network that weaves throughout the MTS and connects the MTS to the other 
Sectors. Information technology and communications (cyber) is the nervous 
system of the complex system of systems that is the MTS.  
3. Transfer of PSGP HLS Boat197 
One of the persistent challenges champions of the PSGP face are the 
stories of waste and mismanagement—sometimes real, sometimes perceived—
that Secretary Chertoff mentioned in his 2007 press conference remarks on the 
Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Grants Program.198  There are many 
such stories about assets purchased with capabilities that far exceed the 
capacity of the grantee to operate, manage, and maintain or stories about 
equipment purchased placed in storage, never used for HLS missions. However, 
                                            
196 UT News, Cockrell School of Engineering, University of Texas, July 30, 2013, 
http://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/30/spoofing-a-superyacht-at-sea accessed March 8, 2016. 
197 Recounted from personal experience as the Coast Guard Fifth District Northern Region 
Director of Auxiliary, Philadelphia, PA from June 2013 to June 2015. 
198 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at a 
Press Conference on the Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Grants Program,” January 
09, 2007, 4–5. 
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the vast majority of grants were executed in fulfillment of the winning proposal. 
The important question is not “Were the grant funds used to fulfill the grant 
proposal?,” but rather “Did funding the grant proposal diminish risk?” 
One more story:  The Borough of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania competed 
for and won a 2004 PSGP grant to purchase a $202,000.00 SAFE Boat 
configured for law enforcement/homeland security patrols along the city’s 
Delaware River boundary. The Borough of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania is home 
to Sun Oil, multiple refineries, the Commodore Barry Bridge to New Jersey, 
spider-webbed with rail and pipelines, Marcus Hook ship anchorage,  and 
bounded by the Delaware River to the east and Interstate 95 to the west. The 
Borough of Marcus Hook is a worthy hub of critical infrastructure to protect. 
By 2010 the Marcus Hook police officers that were trained to operate the 
vessel had retired or left the Marcus Hook Police Department. The Borough soon 
realized that ownership and operation of such a high-performance vessel was an 
expensive commitment. Crews had to be trained to handle the vessel, and 
constantly train and exercise in operating it to maintain competency. Insurance, 
fuel, storage, maintenance costs are very expensive challenges as well. The 
Borough decided it would be best to try and divest itself of the SAFE Boat. 
Conveniently, the Coast Guard Auxiliary199—a wholly voluntary civilian 
organization affiliated with the U.S. Coast Guard—was interested in accepting 
the donation of the Marcus Hook SAFE Boat. There was a concern about the 
potential conflict of interest in accepting the SAFE Boat since the U.S. Coast 
Guard cannot benefit directly from PSGP grants. With the legal determination 
made that, though the CG Auxiliary is related to the U.S. Coast Guard, it is not 
part of the Coast Guard per se and was, therefore, eligible to receive the gifted 
SAFE Boat. FEMA, as the PSGP administrator, was requested to provide a legal 
                                            
199 The U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary is an all-volunteer civilian cadre whose mission is to 
assist the Coast Guard in promoting recreational boating safety, augment the Coast Guard and 
enhance safety and security of our ports, waterways, and coastal regions, and to support Coast 
Guard operational, administrative, and logistical requirements. (From http://cgaux.org/about.php 
accessed February 20, 2016). 
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determination on the disposition of the SAFE Boat’s transfer to the CG Auxiliary.  
(Figure 24) 
The response from FEMA was “Because Grant #2004-EU-T3-0041 is 
closed, FEMA does not retain a financial interest in the disposition of the SAFE 
Boat. After a grant closes, all jurisdictions that purchased equipment with 
Homeland Security Grant Funds should follow their policies and procedures for 
disposition of surveyed or excess equipment.” 
 
 
Figure 24.  FEMA letter regarding disposition of  
Homeland Security SAFE Boat. 
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Nothing is suggested to be out of order in the disposition of the SAFE Boat 
transfer to the Coast Guard Auxiliary. However, there certainly are questions that 
can be—and should be—raised about accountability of grant recipients’ ability to 
responsibly manage assets purchased through PSGP grant proposals, how 
effective any given proposal can be expected to improve the security of the MTS, 
and the appropriateness of a proposal for MTS security. A reasonable observer 
could perceive that the transfer of the SAFE Boat to the Coast Guard Auxiliary 
was a waste of almost one-quarter million dollars of taxpayer money.   
E. INTERPRETATION, ANALYSIS, FUSION AND SYNTHESIS OF ALL 
RELEVANT DATA AND EVIDENCE 
The PSGP was initially intended to provide public sector port entities with 
funding to support hardening of the port infrastructure from terrorist attack. 
Examples of port hardening include installation of closed circuit cameras, 
purchase of watercraft and vehicles for patrolling the ports, and to ensure 
interoperability between jurisdictions and agencies. Future iterations of the PSGP 
evolved to include port security funding to the private sector MTS stakeholders 
as well, but, still they were focused on hardening the infrastructure.   
Protection, as mentioned earlier, is defensive by nature, and as such, is a 
“brittle strategy.”200  Program managers recognized that and began including port 
resiliency as doctrine.   
However, apparent contradictions in PSGP guidelines prove problematic 
to achieving resiliency as a PSGP target goal. Some examples of apparent 
contradictions include: 
 Applicants are “encouraged” to submit proposals consistent with 
the AMSC’s Area Maritime Security Plan. But they don’t have to. 
 Proposals should support filling gaps in the respective AMSC’s 
Port-Wide Risk Mitigation Plans (PRMP). But the PRMP is optional, 
and its maintenance not required—although encouraged. 
                                            
200 CRS R42683, 2012, 13 and Summary. 
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The MTS is a system of systems,201 yet the current PSGP guidance 
disallows consortia—a system of stakeholders—from submitting coordinated 
systems-oriented proposals. The PSGP only allows for proposals from individual 
entities rather than coordinated proposals from interdependent port stakeholders 
that focus on the port system. 
 
  
                                            
201 DHS, “National Strategy for Maritime Security–Maritime Transportation System Security 
Recommendations,” 2. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The frustrations and inefficiencies recognized by the port stakeholders 
have been called out in a previous thesis published at the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security. Pamela N. (Broughton) Haverkos noted in her March 2009 
thesis on “Measuring Preparedness: Assessing the Impact of the Homeland 
Security Grant Program,” that “[t]he lack of a common preparedness vision … 
and the time compressed requirements have all contributed to the inability to 
measure the impact the HSGP has made on preparedness.”202  Seven years 
later, the Port Security Grant Program continues to suffer from the same issues 
that the greater HSGP has had to struggle with, without resolution. 
The PSGP had flirted with good policy, but then changed direction. 
Throughout this research, the PSGP was found to fill a very tangible need but is 
doing so in a less than optimal fashion. The recommendations that follow are not 
in any particular order, but rather are all considered important opportunities to 
improve the PSGP. 
A. MAINTAIN THE PSGP AS A DISCRETE GRANT PROGRAM 
First and foremost, it is recommended that the Port Security Grant 
Program remain a separate and specific grant program rather than becoming 
incorporated into a broad, universal Homeland Security Grant Program. Because 
the ports are part of our national borders and through which over 90% of our 
international trade takes place, the PSGP must remain a standalone grant 
program.  
B. IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF PROPOSAL REVIEW AND GRANT 
AWARD PROCESS 
One of the criticisms from the field that has dogged the PSGP throughout 
its existence is the lack of transparency in the proposal vetting process and 
                                            
202 Pamela N. Broughton, “Measuring Preparedness: Assessing the Impact of the Homeland 
Security Grant Program” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 67. 
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absence of good and timely feedback to AMSCs on why proposals were 
accepted or not. This lack of good communication throughout the PSGP cycle 
has led to a sense of disenfranchisement by the very community being asked to 
work towards improving the security and resiliency of its port system.   
The national level program needs to incorporate into the PSGP process a 
360º feedback loop. Currently, FEMA GPD hosts pre-announcement 
conferences, in person and by teleconference, in advance of the NOFO’s 
release. However, after that, very little contact is made with the applicant 
communities. The following communications processes are recommended: 
 GPD should provide periodic progress updates.   
 GPD’s outreach effort should always be ongoing. The development 
of the PSGP guidelines needs to be a perpetually iterative process 
that fully engages all constituents.   
 Engage the Maritime Security Council as a national information hub 
for port security. The Maritime Security Council is the 
Transportation Sector’s Maritime Subsector Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centers (ISAC).   
C. JETTISON THE COOKIE CUTTER 
1. Allow the Employment of Fiduciary Agents and Consortia as 
an Option  
The PSGP on occasions has provided alternative avenues to problem 
solving. The use of fiduciary agents (FA) and allowance for consortia to submit 
proposals are two examples. Use of both the fiduciary agent and explicit 
allowance for consortia are no longer options. The tendency of the PSGP 
guidelines has been to publish a “one size fits all” process where the same 
constraints apply to all applicants, or all applicants within a port category. 
Addressing port security by a cookie cutter template is suboptimal. The adage of 
“if you have seen one port, you have seen one port” is accurate. Some are 
mega-ports with an eclectic mix of commercial activity operating throughout the 
MTS, situated in major metropolitan areas and part of an intermodal hub. Other 
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ports are small, specialized areas far from major population centers. All are ports 
of entry. A one-size-fits-all model will not work with such diversity. 
For some project proposals, a fiduciary agent may be the best process for 
achieving a proposal goal. Since ports are systems, and systems within other 
systems, to address port security and resiliency ONLY by addressing individual 
entities is inadequate to addressing the risks of disruptions to ports. Consortia, 
on the other hand, are a well suited option for addressing shared systemic port 
security and resiliency shortfalls across multiple entities. 
Due to the variety of port types and the infinite number of risks and 
challenges faced by the nation’s diverse ports, the best way to assure the highest 
return on investment from grant awards is by allowing the greatest flexibility to 
achieving the goal of the PSGP. Accountability is a critical capability for any 
public program. The PSGP has had challenges in accounting for how much any 
given grant award has reduced risk.   
The decision to allow for the use of fiduciary agents and consortia is not 
the best process for every proposal. There are the additional costs to consider, 
such as the FA’s surcharge (of on average 3%–5% of the grant value) and 
inability for grantees to have direct communications with FEMA GPD. These are 
tradeoffs to consider when planning a project proposal for a grant award under 
the PSGP. 
Metrics are critical for efficient project management. A quick way to 
establish good PSGP metrics is to require each port to maintain an up to date 
port-wide risk mitigation plan (PRMP) with grant proposals linked to closing a 
specific PRMP gap, and then evaluate how well the proposal succeeded in filling 
that gap and reducing risk. The scale then becomes a relative measure of 
success at reducing the risk posed by the identified gap in a given port’s PRMP.  
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2. Not all Ports are the Same  
The PSGP struggled with and modified a port tier or group process across 
many versions. At times there were up to four different tiers or groups,203 down to 
three, then two, now none. During the tier/group variants of the PSGP, a certain 
pool of funding was set aside for each tier. Members of each tier/group competed 
against each other for the pool allotted to their contingent. Understandably, this 
system weighted priority to provide a greater pool of funding to those ports that 
represented a higher risk to the nation if disrupted.  
With all ports competing against one another, the likelihood is that the 
historic Tier/Group I ports will have greater success at competing for PSGP funds 
than the lesser ports. As evidenced by the earlier example of how hijacker Atta 
managed to avoid notice by flying into Boston from Portland, ME, smaller ports 
matter. The tier/group system assured all ports could compete for limited 
resources, allocated by the relative risk and consequence for the given port.204 
Early in the PSGP, specific funding levels were pre-identified for specific 
ports. The first grant awards were direct grants to ports of predesignated 
amounts. Table 4 details the initial allocations of port security grants in the Fiscal 






                                            
203 The name changed from tier to group over the course of time, but the mean the same 
thing. 
204 Respondent 16258, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016. 
205 Department of Homeland Security, “The Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative 
Port Security Grant Program,” http://ojp.gov/archives/solicitations/docs/fy03uasi_psg.pdf. 
(accessed January 10, 2016). 
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FISCAL YEAR 2003 UASI PORT SECURITY GRANT 
PROGRAM FUNDING ALLOCATIONS 
Port / Amount Port / Amount 
New York/New Jersey  $9,371,21 Los Angeles/Long Beach  $9,076
Seattle  $6,765,72 Hampton Roads  $6,600
Miami  $6,595,00 Houston  $6,546
Philadelphia  $6,450,21 New Orleans  $6,400
Beaumont  $5,611,56 Charleston  $5,124
Port Canaveral, FL  $4,352,37 San Juan, PR  $1,605
Valdez  $250,00 LA LOOP  $250
TOTAL: $75,000,000
Table 4.   Initial Allocations of Port Security Grants. Source: The Fiscal Year 
2003 Urban Areas Security Initiative Port Security Grant Program. 
FEMA observed that ports put minimal effort into grant spending proposals 
when they were guaranteed a certain amount of funding.206  Alternatively, when 
all ports compete against one another without weighting or set-asides, the 
smaller—but no less potential target—ports are at risk of losing out to the larger 
ports for grant funding.   
A better solution would be a blending of the two approaches for deciding 
funding amounts, whereby grouping ports would again use risk and consequence 
potential with a guaranteed set-aside pool for each group to compete for. Port 
grouping with funding set-asides had been used in the 2007 PSGP Guidelines 
and was generally appreciated by grant applicant stakeholders.  2007 was when 
the program moved from a list of pre-identified eligible ports to grouping ports 
into tiers based on some factors including the variables in the risk equation. Each 
Tier would receive a block of funding to compete for funding proposals. The 
Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Program: Port Security, Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit allocated grant fund by tiered port in Table 5:207 
 
 
                                            
206 Respondent 16258, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016. 
207 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2007 Infrastructure Protection Program: 
Port Security, Program Guidelines and Application Kit, 5, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/
grant/psgp/fy07_psgp_guidance.pdf. (accessed January 7, 2016). 
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PSGP FY07 Available Funding ($ millions) 
 Tier I:  $120,702,000 
 Tier II:  $40,234,000 
 Tier III:  $30,175,500 
 Tier IV:  $10,058,500 
TOTAL $201,170,000 
Table 5.   Allocated Grant Fund by Tiered Port. Source: Fiscal Year 2007 
Infrastructure Protection Program: Port Security,  
Program Guidelines and Application Kit. 
It is recommended that the PSGP restore allocation of funds through the 
port tier or group prioritization practice, as was done for FY 2007. 
3. Require AMSC’s to maintain the PRMP/ BCRTP  
It is highly recommended that all ports develop and maintain a Port-wide 
Risk Management Plan (PRMP) and Business Continuity/Resumption of Trade 
Plan (BCRTP). A well-developed and maintained PRMP and BCRTP provides for 
clearly articulated consensus on a security and resiliency plan for a given 
AMSC’s port system. The PRMP/BCRTP provides a means for measuring the 
degree of risk reduced by awarded grant funds, as well as suggesting clear ways 
forward for successive grant cycles.   
Done properly, the PRMP/BCRTP is a roadmap to continual improvement 
for the port’s security and resiliency posture, informing successive iterations, and 
a living feedback loop to the AMSC and program managers in Washington, DC. 
By having a port-wide, long-term plan with clearly established performance 
milestones, DHS and FEMA will be able to articulate to Congress exactly where 
the money has gone and how it has improved port security and resiliency. 
Furthermore, the PRMP/BCRTP process, by design, approaches port security 
and resiliency from the perspective of systems management. They fully align with 
the National Preparedness Goal. 
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As such, a PRMP/BCRTP MTS-wide strategy would benefit from an 
allowance for consortiums to form and submit proposals and compete equally 
with all port stakeholders for PSGP awards. 
4. Cost Sharing; Less is More for the Private Sector208 
The legislation requires a 25% cost share. Prior NOFOs had split cost 
share percentages between the public and private sector (i.e., 25% for public 
sector entities and 50% for private sector entities), perceived by the private 
sector as an intentional effort to drive funding towards the public sector. Without 
a mandate beyond the minimal requirements under the MTSA, the private sector 
viewed additional investment in security and resiliency as costs that subtracted 
from the bottom-line without any guaranteed return on investment. There is 
insurance for business disruptions, but insurance is discretionary spending. A 
disruptive event could come from any number of directions, the least of which 
was probably from the waterside of the facility. Less likely even yet would be a 
terrorist attack. Private sector participation may increase if the cost-share 
percentage becomes a flat 25% for both the public and private sectors.   
It is recommended that the cost share percentage remain at the minimum 
25% for both public and private sector entities. 
5. Core Capabilities as PSGP Objectives Must Be Revised  
The PSGP consistently insists that proposals be designed to address the 
core capabilities from the National Preparedness Goal. Those core capabilities 
are: 
(1) Strengthening governance integration;  
(2) Enhancing strategic ports within the National Port Readiness 
Network;  
(3) Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA);  
                                            
208 Respondent 12563, Interview by Paul Arnett, telephone, Cleveland, March 9, 2016. 
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(4) Enhancing Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) prevention, 
protection, response and supporting recovery capabilities within the 
maritime domain;  
(5) Enhancing cybersecurity;  
(6) Maritime security risk mitigation projects that support port resilience 
and recovery capabilities, as identified in an Area Maritime Security 
Plan or facility security plan;  
(7) Training and exercises; and  
(8) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
Implementation.209  
Item (1) is profoundly vague. However, it should stay that way for 
maximum flexibility. Improvement of governance is always good. 
Item (2) is certainly a national priority, but not necessarily one of the 
highest in importance to regional private sector port stakeholders. This is a 
federal priority and should be a direct line item for federal expenditure, not an 
additional burden on the local economy or private sector port stakeholders.   
Item (3), MDA, has been a struggle that has not been fully realized. Done 
properly, MDA would be provided by a blending of federal, state, and local 
intelligence sharing with a liaison to the private sector, perhaps through the 
Maritime ISAC.   
Item (4) is defense oriented, and as previously highlighted, is a brittle 
strategy. If, as by the National Preparedness Strategy, the goal is to be prepared 
for “all hazards,” this legacy of early post-911 reaction is too narrowly focused 
and should be re-written to speak broadly of including resiliency measures 
versus solely defensive ones.  
Item (5) is a nascent apprehension that is gaining momentum, as we 
realize that digitizing has made us more vulnerable to attack. The greater 
                                            
209 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) - Grants Office LLC, http://www.grantsoffice.com/
GrantDetails.aspx?gid=17040 (accessed April 06, 2016). 
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efficiencies we have realized through digital technologies have also made us 
more dependent, interdependent, and vulnerable.210   
Cyber security is a valid and important aspect of port security, and it 
deserves to be supported to the full extent of enabling capability, to include the 
PSGP. 
Item (6) speaks to AMSPs and port resiliency and recovery capabilities. 
Those capabilities recognize the MTS as an interdependent system of systems, 
not separate entities.   
To fulfill this requirement, the PSGP must allow consortia to participate in 
the grant competition along with individual entities to support holistic port-wide 
port security and resiliency plans. 
Item (7) is important and figures strongly in the development of those 
relationships and realization of the depth of interdependency that exists within 
the MTS. Training and exercises are an essential function for building port 
security and resiliency and should continue to be encouraged. 
Item (8), Transportation Workers Identification Credential, has long since 
deployed. TWIC should be removed as a specific line-item capability from the 
PSGP. All MTSA regulated entities required now to comply with the TWIC 
regulations. 
6. Re-visit the Risk Equation 
The Risk Equation is ubiquitous. It has become so commonplace that it is 
often assumed to be a fundamental truth that is seldom challenged or 
questioned. It is recited by muscle memory and even accepted as a 
mathematical fact by non-mathematicians, on comparable footing with the 
Pythagorean Theorem or Einstein’s E=mc2. But it is not a mathematical formula; 
                                            
210 Unrestricted first-person knowledge experienced during my tour in DHS, National 
Protection and Program Directorate, Office of Infrastructure Protection. 
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it is a model that attempts to simplify relationships between variables that 
influence Risk.211  Instead of 
Risk = Vulnerability X Threat X Consequence 
a better model is 
R= ƒ[(V)(T)(C)]. 
That is, Risk is a Function of the relationships between Vulnerability, 
Threat, and Consequence. The PSGP’s early focus on defensive measures 
addressed changing the Vulnerability variable of the equation. By building 
resiliency into port systems, the PSGP seeks to modify the Consequence 
variable. The Threat variable is best controllable through intelligence to provide 
opportunities for disrupting intentional threats through preemptive measures. It is 
more difficult to modify the Threat variable for natural events, as they are 
primarily geographically determined, and a certain degree of prediction and 
probability is possible. 
The Coast Guard’s MS-RAM program uses this latter variant of the Risk 
Equation, adding weighting factors to each variable, to estimate the Risk of a 
specific asset in a given scenario. However, we must be careful not to fall into the 
trap that the number generated is related to any mathematical solution. It does 
not equate to any greater or lesser probability that something will happen.212   
 
  
                                            
211 Jeff Lowder, August 23, 2010 post on BloInfoSec.com, http://www.bloginfosec.com/2010/
08/23/why-the-risk-threats-x-vulnerabilities-x-impact-formula-is-mathematical-nonsense/ 
(accessed January 19, 2016). 




“The German thrust into Western Europe in World War II is a 
natural analog:  The Wehrmacht simply side-stepped the 
impressive defenses built by the French in the Maginot Line. 
Similarly, terrorists will attack wherever the defenses are 
weakest.”213   
 
Ms. Rugy’s statement directly relates to the Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP), as the focus has been from the start on hardening critical infrastructure 
(CI) through direct funding of individual entities rather than looking at the port as 
a system. By focusing on the brittle strategy of defensive measures versus 
reinforcing the resilience of the MTS, the PSGP is largely in the business of 
building Maginot Lines, or worse, building independent pill boxes, which the 
Threat can bypass rather than directly confront. This analogy applies to natural 
and man-made disruptive events. 
Instead, the goal of the PSGP should be to make the MTS like a block of 
ballistic gel; able to absorb impact and still retain its shape. 
The national level policy makes strengthening, maintenance, protection, 
and building resiliency into, our critical infrastructure a national priority. To the 
point, PPD-21 states: 
Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and 
maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure–
including assets, networks, and systems–that are vital to public 
confidence and the Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being. 
The Nation’s critical infrastructure is diverse and complex. It 
includes distributed networks, varied organizational structures and 
operating models (including multinational ownership), 
interdependent functions and systems in both the physical space 
                                            
213 Veronique de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” “What Does 
Homeland Security Spending Buy?,” AEI Economic Policy Working Paper Series (2005): 5. 
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and cyberspace, and governance constructs that involve multilevel 
authorities, responsibilities, and regulations.214 
Critical infrastructure is recognized by national policy as a complex system 
of interdependent systems. Yet, after a decade and a half, the PSGP still focuses 
on individual entities within a port system rather than require proposals that 
address broader MTS security and resiliency shortfalls. The NIPP speaks of 
“cascading effects”215—the dropping dominos of second, third, and tertiary order 
critical infrastructure impacts from events. It is within the cascade that the 
greatest costs of an event are realized.   
Our nation has built its economic vitality on the efficiencies gained from 
leveraging proximity, networked synergies, digitization, and just-in-time 
deliveries. These technologies and strategies are great for business, provided 
there are no threats to that system of systems. Unfortunately, al-Qaida and its ilk 
have stated their intentions are to bring down America by destroying the U.S. 
economy. 
What made the U.S. economy so effective and competitive also makes it 
vulnerable. With over 90% of U.S. trade occurring through the seaports, the MTS 
represents a very attractive target. Terrorists can exploit two different attack 
modes through the MTS:  a direct attack on the port itself, or use the MTS as a 
gateway for moving persons and materiel into the U.S. to support operations 
elsewhere within the U.S.  
The ports are the final line of defense before terrorists enter the country. 
They are an essential node of the economy. They are fundamentally open to 
facilitate commercial activity. The general population seldom notices the seaport 
as they drive past them. 
Located on the water, the MTS is highly vulnerable to not only terrorist 
attack but natural disasters. Hurricanes, flooding, ice jams, failed levees, storm 
                                            
214 Presidential Directive / PPD-21—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 1. 
215 DHS, NIPP 2013. 
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surge, climate change all have severely impacted the MTS periodically. With a 
large number of process facilities located on the waterways, depending on the 
waterway for process water as well as for transportation, the potential for impact 
of the MTS from accidental man-made source has a long history as well. 
The MTS deserves specific, targeted federal support to improve its 
security and resiliency posture. Doing so should be a national priority. The PSGP 
is an excellent vehicle for doing so. It has, on occasion, exhibited promising 
insight and potential to affect improvement in the status quo of port security and 
resiliency. And at times, it has backed away.   
The PSGP must remain a program dedicated to improving the status quo 
of port security and resiliency. The MTS is a system of systems. With that 
recognition, PRMPs should be used as both proposal justification as well as the 
means to measure efficacy. It must accept port-specific proposals, to include 
accepting consortia and if suitable, fiduciary agents to facilitate proposal 
execution, as well as from individual port stakeholders. The one-size-fits-all 
cookie cutter model is unacceptable and inefficient. Such an approach 
guarantees each and every GAO report for the out years will include the phrase 
“FEMA is making progress but ….”   
The PSGP must maintain a discrete port-centric homeland security grant 
program. The cost-share obligation must remain 25% for both public and private 
sector grantees. Reestablishing the tier group port system with set-asides for 
each tier/group will ensure all ports have a fair chance to win priority, proportional 
funds. 
The Port Security Grant Program, indeed, can be made better. 
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